




The Economy and Poverty in the 
Twentieth Century in South Africa
Nicoli Nattrass
Jeremy Seekings
CSSR Working Paper No. 276
July 2010
Nicoli Nattrass is Director of the AIDS and Society Research Unit in the Centre for 
Social Science Research and Professor of Economics at the University of Cape Town.
Jeremy Seekings is Director of the Social Surveys Unit in the Centre for Social Science 
Research and a professor of Political Studies and Sociology at the University of Cape 
Town; email jeremy.seekings@uct.ac.za
A shortened version of this paper is forthcoming in Anne Mager, Bill Nasson and Robert 
Ross (eds), The Cambridge History of South Africa, vol.2 (Cambride UP).
The Economy and Poverty in the 






The South African economy experienced substantial growth and change over the 
course of the twentieth century. By the time of Union in 1910, gold-mining on 
the Witwatersrand had already and rapidly transformed what had been a 
peripheral agricultural economy into an industrialising economy with a strong 
minerals export sector.  Gold attracted British capital and European immigrants, 
and made possible secondary industrialisation and four decades of sustained 
economic growth in the middle of the century. Between the early 1930s and 
early 1970s, the South African economy grew approximately ten-fold in real 
terms, and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita rose steadily (see Figure 1).  
At the end of the apartheid era, in 1994, South Africa accounted for almost 
exactly one-half of the total GDP of sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP, 1997: Table 
25).  
        
 
Figure 1: Real GDP per capita, 1932-2001. 
Source: Statistics South Africa and the South African Reserve Bank (from 1932); data for 
1911-12, 1917-18 and 1927-28 from Du Plessis (1950), rescaled on data for 1937-38. 
 
The South African growth path followed the typical development trajectory, 
with the leading sector shifting from agriculture, to minerals, to manufacturing 
and then services. South Africa adopted many policies and built institutions not 
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dissimilar to those in Australia and elsewhere in the industrialising world.  In 
other respects, however, South Africa was far from typical in two very visible 
respects.  Firstly, alongside a set of policies and institutions that could be found 
elsewhere was a second set of unusually coercive and discriminatory policies 
and institutions. The former protected the incomes of mostly white workers, 
through labour-market institutions and the welfare state, whilst the latter helped 
to depress the wages paid to unskilled, African workers.  This combination of 
policies and institutions not only ensured high inequality in terms of who got 
what in the short-term, but also shaped the growth path of the economy such that 
high inequality continued over time.  Secondly, structural economic change was 
accompanied by a fundamental shift in the labour market, from chronic labour 
shortages to what was almost the highest measured unemployment rate in the 
world. Rising unemployment was a feature of most oil importing countries 
following the oil price hikes of the early 1970s. In South Africa, however, 
unemployment was exacerbated by government policies and institutions.  These 
had destroyed the African peasantry, organised the labour market for the benefit 
of a small number of privileged „insiders‟, and undermined employment growth.  
Under apartheid, the economy moved down an ever-more capital- and skill-
intensive growth path, with the result that at the end of the century fewer than 50 
percent of people of working age were actually working, whilst skilled labour 
shortages constrained the growth of both skilled and unskilled employment.  
Despite the transition to democracy in the 1990s, many of the institutional and 
structural features which shaped the apartheid growth path continue to shape the 
post-apartheid growth path in ways that perpetuate inequality and poverty into 
the twenty-first century.  
 
In this chapter we analyse South African economic history in the Twentieth 
Century in terms of three periods, pointing to crucial changes in the economy 
and the roles therein played by the state, and the consequences of these for 
poverty.  The first period, from Union in 1910 until 1932, was characterised by 
economic stagnation at the same time as an extraordinary building of state 
institutions to intervene in the economy.  In this period the foundations were laid 
for the labour market and other institutions that were to shape subsequent 
economic development and the distribution of earnings. The second period, from 
1933 to about 1945, saw rapid growth and structural change. This growth and 
change continued into the third, „apartheid‟ period of 1945-1989. In the 
apartheid period, strong economic growth (at least until the 1970s) masked 
economic weakness: growth was slow relative to comparable economies as 
South Africa failed to take full advantage of either the benefits of gold-mining 
or the post-war global boom. Export growth was lacklustre, production 
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depended more and more on limited internal markets, and the profit rate fell.  
Growth faltered in the 1970s and stagnated in the 1980s.   
 
The character of economic growth in South Africa meant that a minority of 
South Africans enjoyed very substantial benefits, whilst the rest of the 
population enjoyed much more modest benefits, and no benefits at all trickled 
down to some people. Poverty persisted despite growth into the second half of 
the century because poor people were dispossessed of access to land and, from 
the 1970s, experienced chronic unemployment. Economic growth without 
commensurate job creation became the primary, immediate cause of poverty and 
inequality in the distribution of income, explaining why poverty in South Africa 
remained higher than in most other economies with similar GDP per capita (and 
even some much poorer countries). In short, the record of the South African 
economy across the Twentieth Century was one of constrained growth and 
persistent poverty although the key drivers of that poverty shifted over time 
from overt racial discrimination to more class-based dynamics, notably the 
growing gap between the employed and the unemployed (Seekings and Nattrass, 
2005). 
 
Much of this simultaneous history of growth and failure can be traced to the 
patterns of state intervention in the economy. South Africa had certain 
advantages, in terms of minerals, harbours and climate, but growth was 
constrained by the absence of a supply of cheap labour and because settlers of 
European origin expected high wages and a racial hierarchy.  From the outset 
the state played a major and central role in almost every aspect of the economy 
in response to these constraints. In some respects, public policy served to 
facilitate profitability and economic growth, albeit often weakly. As Marxist 
scholars argued, the state played a major role in ensuring a supply of „cheap‟, 
largely unskilled African labour to some economic sectors, notably farms and 
(to a lesser extent) mines. Bonner, Delius and Posel (1993: 4) conclude that „the 
particular path of industrialization in South Africa is attributable in large 
measure to an abundant supply of disenfranchised, low-wage, unskilled black 
labour‟.  „Cheap‟ (African) labour was, however, only one half of the story.  The 
state also implemented policies and established institutions designed to ensure 
that its white citizens enjoyed a „civilised‟ standard of living, through a 
combination of high earnings, protected employment and a welfare state.  The 
commitment to maintaining white citizens‟ standard of living at a level 
commensurate with those in the very much wealthier economies of Australia 
and Britain shaped both the path and pace of economic growth and change. 
Racial discrimination and coercion largely excluded unskilled workers and 
African people generally from the institutional framework that fostered and 
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protected privilege. When, in the later apartheid period, African workers pushed 
their way inside the edifice of wage-raising institutions, they encouraged 
employers to shift more towards skill- and capital-intensive production, thereby 
limiting even further the growth of unskilled jobs and contributing to the 
perpetuation of unemployment, poverty and inequality. 
 
 
2. Economic stagnation, 1910-32 
 
South Africa was still, at the time of Union, a sparsely-populated, predominantly 
arid country, with a largely agrarian society, although with crucially important 
pockets of extraordinary industrial activity. Johannesburg and the 
Witwatersrand, and to a lesser extent Cape Town also, seemed to locals to be 
booming, but the entire Witwatersrand had a population of only half a million 
people in 1921.  Three quarters of the country‟s almost six million people lived 
in the countryside. Whilst deep poverty was probably generally limited to 
episodes of drought or disease, rural prosperity was limited to specific areas 
producing for lucrative export markets or the small but growing domestic urban 
and industrial markets. Indeed, „poor whites‟ comprised a substantial minority of 
the white population: unskilled and unable to compete even with African 
farmers disadvantaged by inferior access to capital and markets, they lived in 
poverty in the countryside or migrated to the towns in a desperate search for 
employment. South African agricultural exports were not insignificant. Exports 
of wool, ostrich feathers and  and maize, as well as sugar cane from the 1920s, 
resulted in pockets of rural affluence – but agriculture was never going to 
transform the South African economy. That was the historical task of gold 
mining. 
 
In 1911, agriculture  accounted for  22 percent of South African national 
income, less than the 27 percent accounted for by mining, and barely more than 
gold-mining alone (Feinstein, 2005: 129). The gold mines of the Witwatersrand 
spread out in a crescent across the Southern Transvaal from Klerksdorp in the 
south-west through the West Rand, Johannesburg and East Rand, to Leslie in the 
south-east. Both the dollar price of gold and the exchange rate were fixed, which 
meant that the rand price of gold remained stable even whilst other commodity 
prices fluctuated erratically. Gold production had plummeted during the South 
African war but recovered quickly thereafter.  In 1910 South Africa produced a 
third of world gold output, and this had risen to over half by 1930 (Official Year 
Book, 1934/5: 519).  Fewer workers were employed in mines than on farms, but 
the mines served to stimulate growth in many other sectors (notably coal, 
timber, food and transport), and gold accounted for more than one half, by 
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value, of all exports from the Union.  The gold mines, producing a product for 
which demand was unlimited at its fixed price, were the „power-house‟ of 
economic development, enabling South Africa „to break free from the 
constraints which had for so long held back its economic development‟ 
(Feinstein, 2005: 109).  
 
The South African economy had grown rapidly in the late Nineteenth and early 
Twentieth Centuries, notwithstanding the disruption of the South African war, 
because of the combination of rapidly expanding gold production and a growing 
world economy. It was primarily gold which pushed economic growth in South 
Africa ahead of most colonies or former colonies. In terms of GDP per capita 
(taking into account purchasing power), however, not even gold had raised 
South Africa to the level of countries on the European periphery (such as Spain, 
Italy or Ireland, although its GDP per capita was higher than Portugal‟s), and it 
lagged far behind other settler societies such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, 
and Argentina (Maddison, 2001). 
 
Gold-mining was the engine of the economy, but it was an engine that required 
constant assistance from the state. The ever greater depth from which gold was 
mined on the Witwatersrand meant that huge investments of capital were needed 
to drive mines deep underground, and to extract the gold from the ore once the 
ore had been brought to the surface. Labour was needed to hack or blast 
underground, and then to bring the generally low-grade ore to the surface. 
Frankel‟s thorough analysis of rates of return on investments in South African 
gold-mining in the period up to 1932 showed that the overall net rate of return of 
4.1 percent p.a. (including capital gains) was broadly commensurate with rates 
earned on alternative investments elsewhere in the world (Frankel, 1967). 
Foreign and domestic investors would not have invested in South African gold-
mining if profitability not been underpinned by the only cost component which 
could be controlled: unskilled, black labour. This was well known at the time. 
The 1934-35 Union Year Book notes that „It is generally admitted that the 
prosperity of South African trade and industry depends to a very great extent on 
an adequate supply of relatively cheap, unskilled non-European labour‟ (245; 
see also the 1926 Mills Report, discussed below). Feinstein calculated that 
doubling the very low wages paid to African workers would have reduced 
dividends and taxes by almost two-thirds, concluding that „higher wages for 
black miners were simply not consistent with minimum levels of profitability‟ 
(Feinstein, 2005: 110-11).  Crush, Jeeves and Yudelman concur: Without „large 
numbers of low-wage, unskilled migrant miners … there would never have been 
a deep-level gold mining industry in South Africa‟. Production would have been 
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limited to „pecking away at the surface outcrops‟, leaving untouched the deep-
lying reefs (Crush et al., 1991: 1).
 
   
 
The mines could have raised wages for African workers if they had been able to 
reduce the wage bill of their white workers. The ratio of the cash earnings of 
white workers to the value of payments in cash and kind to African workers 
peaked at about twelve to one in 1921, and was about ten to one for the rest of 
the interwar period (Wilson, 1972: 66). The minority of white workers 
consistently received more, and sometimes substantially more, than the large 
majority of African workers. Unsurprisingly, the mines sought to replace 
expensive white with cheaper workers, including both Chinese labour in 1906-
10) and African workers, provoking industrial protest, violent rebellion (in the 
1922 Rand Revolt), and political intervention. Given their fiscal and general 
economic dependence on gold-mining, successive governments were wary of 
raising further production costs on the mines (Yudelman, 1983), and therefore 
looked to other sectors to employ increased numbers of white workers at 
appropriately high wages; but the state did not allow the mining industry to 
change significantly its cost structure by employing African workers in semi-
skilled or skilled positions.  
 
The economics of gold-mining encouraged the emergence of large mining-
finance houses that could raise the massive capital necessary for opening mines 
as well as operate them thereafter.  In 1887 Rhodes and his partner Rudd paved 
the way with the establishment of Gold Fields of South Africa (which later 
became Consolidated Gold Fields). Registered in London, the company served 
as a vehicle for raising British capital. Other houses were established by the 
Albu family (which later grew into General Mining), Eckstein (which became 
Rand Mines), Wernher and Beit (which grew into Central Mining), Goerz 
(which became the Union Corporation), and Barnato (Johannesburg 
Consolidated Investments or JCI). These six mining and finance houses 
dominated the industry. Given the fixed prices of gold, there was little reason for 
them to compete, and many reasons for them to collude – which they did, 
through the Chamber of Mines, established in 1889, The Chamber organized the 
recruitment of unskilled labour from across Southern Africa, and set the 
„maximum average‟ wages that mines were allowed to pay African mine-
workers.  
 
In the 1910s, gold mining expanded into the Far East Rand, which was the turf 
of Ernest Oppenheimer and the Anglo American Corporation, formed in 1917 
with British and American funding. By 1919 the eleven mines on the Far East 
Rand were generating more than twice as much profit as the forty-odd mines 
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along the rest of the Witwatersrand.  Although Anglo-American was the most 
profitable, Rand Mines remained the largest of the mining and finance houses in 
the mid-1930s, in terms of gold production, employment and number of mines 
(Wilson, 1972: 24).  At much the same time as it emerged as a major player in 
gold, Anglo American began to expand aggressively in the diamond industry, in 
direct competition with De Beers. Using both political contacts inside the South 
African state and its access to foreign funding, Anglo American bought massive 
diamond mining companies in Namibia. In the 1920s, it expanded rapidly in 
Angola, the Congo, West Africa, British Guiana and, within South Africa, in 
Namaqualand and Lichtenburg. Finally, in 1929, Oppenheimer and Anglo 
American took over De Beers (Innes, 1984). 
 
Whilst this was a period of flux in the ownership and control of mines, it was 
not a period of growth for either the gold mining industry in particular or the 
economy as a whole. The volume and value of gold production and employment 
remained broadly stable through the 1910s and 1920s (Feinstein, 2005: 105; 
Crush et al., 1991: Table A.4). The South African economy grew in current 
prices, but there were large fluctuations in prices (and inconsistencies in how 
these were measured) and it is therefore difficult to calculate a reliable real 
growth rate. Indeed, the South African state only began to collect systematic 
data on prices in 1919. The prices of agricultural exports, such as wool 
(Houghton, 1971: 24), were especially volatile. What is clear is that the South 
African economy experienced two sharp recessions, in the early 1920s and then 
during the first part of the Great Depression (approximately 1929-32), with a 
short period of growth in the mid-1920s and sustained growth from 1933 (Du 
Plessis, 1950). Depending on the choice of price data, real GDP per capita 
between 1911 and 1932 probably stagnated, perhaps rose marginally, but may 
even have declined.  Figure 1 does not show a series for the period before 1932, 
but shows estimates for three years, as calculated by Frankel (and reported by 
Du Plessis, 1950).
1
 Data on the wages paid to white workers in the diamond 
                                                 
1
 Du Plessis (1950) reports estimates for selected years between 1911-12 and 1948-49, for 
national income per capita, in 1938 prices.  We have rescaled the pre-1932 estimates to fit the 
1938 estimate from the Statistics South Africa and SARB series.  Houghton (1971) suggests 
that it was only in 1933 or 1934 that real GDP per capita re-attained its 1920 level, before 
accelerating. Feinstein fudges his analysis of growth, probably because of this 
unacknowledged uncertainty over prices. Drawing on Maddison (2001), he discusses the 
1913-50 period as a whole (2005: 5-7), even though it really comprised two distinct periods, 
of fluctuating stagnation (to 1932) followed by rapid growth (thereafter). Feinstein 
emphasises that South Africa „escaped most of the adverse effects of the depression‟ (2005: 
7), but this does not mean it escaped the adverse effects altogether. Uncertainty over prices 
might also mean that Maddison‟s estimates for real GDP per capita in 1913 exaggerate the 
extent of South Africa‟s relative prosperity. 
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industry suggests that real wages rose minimally between 1910 and 1932. In the 
building industry, real wages rose by about 10 percent over this period (Year 
Book 1934-35: 240, 243).  
 
Economic growth may have been muted during the 1920s, but the economy did 
not suffer as adversely during the Great Depression as most other major 
economies. The demand for most agricultural exports and diamonds fell sharply, 
but the demand for gold was unaffected. Most farmers and South African 
manufacturers were producing for the local rather than the export market and 
were therefore partly cushioned from the global crisis. Retrenchments in 
manufacturing were largely limited to African workers, so that the main effects 
of the depression were felt in the reserves. Moreover, public works programmes 
were established to employ unemployed white men (and, to a much lesser 
extent, coloured men). By mid-1933, perhaps as many as one in twelve white 
male workers was employed on a public or subsidised works programme. 
 
 
3. Building a modern, economic state 
 
The 1910s and 1920s might have been a period of general economic stagnation, 
but they saw a remarkable process of state-building as the South African state 
acquired a wide range of economic roles.  In South Africa, as in Britain and the 
other British dominions, the state moved away from the laissez-faire liberalism 
of the Nineteenth Century to the more interventionist and regulatory mode 
associated with the „new liberalism‟ (or, in parts of Europe, social democracy).  
The state‟s concern with economic management was evident in that no fewer 
than nine out of thirteen Union government departments covered broadly 
economic topics, i.e. Finance, Agriculture, Lands, Mines, Commerce and 
Industries (merged with Mines as Mines and Industries from 1912 to 1933), 
Education, Posts and Telegraphs, Railways and Harbours, and Public Works.
2
 
Over the following twenty years, the state acquired the capacity to intervene in 
these and other areas of the economy. In terms of its fiscal capability, its 
capacity to collect and use statistics, its strategic interventions in industrial 
development and social welfare, and perhaps above all its interventions in wage 
determination and the regulation of employment, the South African state 
adopted the form of the modern economic state, empowering it in its dealings 
with the powerful capitalist elites in gold-mining and other sectors.    
 
                                                 
2
 The other four departments were Defence, Interior, Justice, and Native Affairs, the last of 
which, especially, had important economic functions. 
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The new state had an almost insatiable thirst for statistics, especially economic 
statistics. The 1914 Statistics Act gave statutory authority to collect statistics to 
a central statistical office, accountable to the Minister of the Interior, who would 
be advised by a Statistical Council. The purpose, as  spelt out in the Act‟s 
subtitle, was „to provide for the collection of statistics relating to agricultural 
and to industrial, commercial, shopping, fishing and other business undertakings 
and other matters in the Union‟. The implementation of the Act was delayed by 
the war, but in 1918 the new Office of Census and Statistics produced its first 
Year Book (following the Australian example). The Year Book includes 
extraordinarily detailed data on almost every aspect of life affecting the 
country‟s white population, and very little on the coloured, Indian or African 
populations.  The new state also began counting just about everything that could 
be counted. By 1919 it had already conducted censuses of manufacturing 
industries, agricultural and pastoral production, rents, the cost of living, wages, 
and the working hours and conditions.   
 
The obsession with expertise extended to the appointment of commissions of 
enquiry into economic matters (as the British state had long been doing). These 
included a series of commissions concerned primarily with the incomes of white 
South Africans. In 1913, amidst bitter industrial conflict, the government 
appointed an Economic Commission, which reported in 1914. Two years later, 
another commission examined poor relief. A Cost of Living Commission 
produced five reports between 1918 and 1920. This was followed by an 
Unemployment Commission (1920) and the Economic and Wage Commission 
of 1925-26. Welfare reforms were examined by a Commission on Old Age 
Pensions and National Insurance, in three reports (1927-29). The onset of the 
Great Depression led to a further flurry of enquiries: an Inter-Departmental 
Committee on the Labour Resources of the Union (1930), an Unemployment 
Investigation Committee (1932), a Native Economic Commission (1932) and a 
Provincial Committee of Inquiry into Social and Charitable Work on the 
Witwatersrand (1934). In 1934-35, the country‟s labour legislation was re-
examined by an Industrial Legislation Commission. Each of these commissions 
collated information and statistics, held hearings, and recommended new 
government programmes and initiatives. 
 
The new state needed additional resources. Its initial concern was with the 
consolidation of the „provincial‟ fiscal systems which relied on profits from the 
state-owned and operated railways, company taxation of gold mines (in the 
Transvaal) and general income taxes in the Cape Colony and Natal. The 1914 
Income Tax Act introduced a Union-wide progressive income tax which was 
supplemented in 1916 with a super-tax on the very rich „By the end of the First 
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World War‟, Lieberman writes, „the income tax surpassed customs duties as the 
single most important source of state revenue‟ (2003: 128). The state continued 
to expand its fiscal capacity to tax all sources of income after the war.  Income 
taxes (excluding taxes on gold mining) and property taxes (i.e. transfer and 
estate duties) together rose from almost nothing in 1910 to about 2 percent of 
GDP by 1920. A Land and Agricultural Bank was established in 1912, to 
provide medium- and long-term loans to farmers. The establishment in 1921 of 
the South African Reserve Bank – the first in the British Empire outside of 
London – added to the government‟s capacity to mobilise and manage financial 
resources (Ally, 1994). By the early 1920s, the South African state had thus 
become, fiscally and monetarily, very much a modern state.   
 
One conspicuous absence from the set of Union government departments was a 
dedicated Department of Labour. The government declined to appoint a Minister 
of Labour despite being pressed to do so by Members of Parliament invoking 
the New Zealand precedent.
3
 Labour matters were run by – and labour 
legislation drafted by – other departments. This changed dramatically in 1924, 
when the Pact Government (comprising the Labour and Nationalist parties) 
came to power in the aftermath of the Rand Revolt. The government established 
the first Department of Labour. Within a year its staff had grown to 154, 
including the former director of census (indicating the importance of statistics 
for the department‟s regulatory work) and notable trade unionists to its 
inspectorate (Simons and Simons, 1983: 328)  
 
The impetus to this dimension of state-building was the militancy of immigrant 
– mostly English and Scottish – white workers on the Witwatersrand, but the 
context was the much more general shift in thinking about the state‟s role in the 
economy. As even the relatively pro-employer members of the Economic and 
Wages Commission recognized in 1926 with respect to the role of the state in 
regulating wages, there had been „a great change in the attitude of the public‟ 
from liberal laissez-faire to direct state intervention: „every English-speaking 
country, following the precedent of the Australasian States, has passed 
legislation providing in certain circumstances for the fixing of wages under 
Statute‟, with the objects of preventing strikes and lock-outs and eliminating 
„excessively low rates of wages‟ (South Africa, 1926: 35). A wave of major 
strikes by white workers in 1913-14 led to the 1914 Economic Commission 
recommending that the state institutionalize „white‟ trade unions and incorporate 
the semi-skilled and skilled working classes through recognition, material 
concessions, and negotiated procedures for dealing with industrial disputes. The 
1918 Factories Act regulated the hours and conditions of employment, the use of 
                                                 
3
 Hansard 15 Nov 1910, col.89. 
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machinery and the prevention of accidents. The 1918 Regulation of Wages, 
Apprentices and Improvers Act regulated the employment of white women and 
young men; this was supplemented by the 1921 Juveniles Act and 1922 
Apprenticeship Act. In 1924, the South African Party government enacted an 
Industrial Conciliation Act that provided for the registration and regulation of 
trade unions and employers‟ associations, and for collective bargaining between 
unions and employers‟ associations in industrial councils (renamed bargaining 
councils in the post-apartheid period). Industrial councils could determine 
wages, benefits, hours and other conditions of employment (see Lever, 1978). 
The accession to power of the union-backed Labour Party, through the Pact 
Government, led to a flurry of pro-labour legislation. The 1925 Wage Act 
provided for the establishment of a Wage Board, which could determine wage 
rates and employment conditions for workers not covered by industrial council 
agreements. The 1926 Mines and Works Act established a clear colour bar on 
the mines. An amendment to the Industrial Conciliation Act, in 1929-30, 
provided for the extension of agreements to apply to all employers and 
employees in the industry and area specified, i.e. not just the actual employers 
and employees represented in the negotiations in the industrial council.  In the 
course of little more than ten years, the state had built the industrial institutions 
that characterized the nascent social democracies of northern Europe and 
Australasia. 
 
With regard to African workers, however, the state retained an essentially 
repressive approach. The 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act provided for the 
registration and control of employment contracts, and regulated migration into 
and residence in towns on the basis of the „pass‟. In addition, colonial-era 
Masters and Servants laws and the 1911 Native Labour Regulation Act served, 
inter alia, to criminalize breaches of employment contracts by African workers 
(for example, through desertion). Trade unions representing African workers 
were not recognized, and were not allowed to participate in centralized 
bargaining. When the Industrial and Commercial Workers‟ Union (ICU) 
emerged in the late 1920s, the Pact Government resorted to mild repression 
rather than incorporation. Even with respect to African workers, however, the 
Department of Labour began to contemplate an incorporative strategy, if only to 
reduce the incentive to employers to replace expensive white workers with 
cheap African workers (Duncan, 1995).  
 
The racialised character of industrial institutions was reflected also in the 
welfare state that successive governments began to build in the 1920s and early 
1930s. Just as the state accepted that wage-setting for white workers could not 
be left to the market alone, so it accepted that the incomes of poor, non-working 
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white people needed to be supplemented by the state. Prior to the 1920s, poor 
white people relied primarily on kin or the churches, with only a small minority 
of workers contributing to insurance schemes and state provision limited to poor 
relief on the British model (Bottomley, 1990; Iliffe, 1987: 115-23). Workers – 
generally the more skilled workers – in some sectors had secured industry- or 
employer-specific insurance against disability or poor health, and provision for 
old-age. The 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act – as subsequently amended – 
provided further scope for the extension of insurance. In the industrial councils, 
unions and employers could bargain not only over wages, but also over benefits 
such as pension schemes. By providing for the extension of agreements to the 
entire industry (under the 1929-30 amendments), the state could ensure that 
whole sectors were covered by contributory, but notionally private, insurance 
schemes, or what might be called quasi-social insurance. The Industrial 
Conciliation Act thus provided the first pillar of South Africa‟s welfare state.   
 
The second pillar of the welfare state entailed social assistance programmes.  
The 1928 Old Age Pensions Act provided means-tested, non-contributory old 
age pensions, for white and coloured people only, broadly as recommended by 
the multi-party Pienaar Commission on Old Age Pensions and National 
Insurance (Seekings, 2007). This prompted a short-lived conservative backlash 
against welfare state-building, but in the mid-1930s and early 1940s the state‟s 
responsibilities were expanded to cover further categories of „deserving‟ poor: 
the blind, people suffering from other disabilities, poor families with children, 
and unemployed workers. The improved public finances resulting from the 
higher gold price made it easier for the state to respond to the challenges of 
drought and depression, whilst party political competition provided some 
impetus (Seekings, 2008). The government also organised the construction of 
housing and controlled rents for white workers (Parnell, 1989). In 1937, the 
newly appointed professor of sociology at the University of the Witwatersrand 
proclaimed in an inaugural lecture, exaggerating only somewhat, that „provision 
for [the] European population‟ in South Africa was „scarcely less complete than 
that of Great Britain‟ (Gray, 1937: 270).   
 
State intervention in the economy extended also to industrial policy. In sector 
after sector, the state stepped in when private investors appeared unable or 
unwilling to commit the necessary capital. The Union government inherited and 
extended responsibility for the railways, in contrast to both North and Latin 
America where private railway companies built and operated the railways.
4
 
                                                 
4
 The lines from the Cape ports and Durban to the Witwatersrand were built and operated by 
the Cape and Natal colonial governments respectively.  The line from Delagoa Bay to the 
Witwatersrand was operated by a private company, but it was taken over by the state after the 
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Almost 8,000 miles of railways were laid between 1890 and 1919 (Houghton, 
1971: 19-20; Solomon, 1983: 100-11), laying the basis for the spectacular 
expansion of the Witwatersrand as the industrial hub of Southern Africa. In the 
1920s, South African Railways focused primarily on improving the existing 
track and then on electrification, enabling the railways to carry much more 
traffic.  One major beneficiary was the Natal coal industry, which was able to 
supply coal to both new power-stations and ports (Heydenrych and du Plooy, 
1994). In the 1920s, it established the Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) 
and Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation (ISCOR), again in large part in 
response to the failure of private firms to raise sufficient capital (Christie, 1984; 
Cross, 1993; Clark, 1994). Whilst the state was willing to set up new parastatal 
industries, it did not nationalise the mining houses. Its preferred mode of 
intervention was through regulation, including of the mining industry (especially 
after 1915. 
 
The state also sought to promote the growth of both manufacturing and 
commercial agriculture. Prior to the 1920s, manufacturing was largely limited to 
light industry producing food and beverages, and to a lesser extent textiles, 
clothing and shoes. A growing chemical industry supplied the mines. Prior to 
1924, however, the state resisted calls for tariff protection, defending free trade.  
A Board of Trade and Industry was sett up in 1921. The 1925 Customs Tariff 
and Excise Duties Amendment Act marked a shift by the Pact Government 
(Kaplan, 1976; Archer, 1989; Martin, 1990). Higher and broader tariffs led to 
the tripling of manufacturing output between 1924/25 and 1938/39, despite the 
depression, as small manufacturing workshops were replaced by larger, more 
capital-intensive factories. Non-mining capitalist interests were certainly 
advanced (Kaplan, 1976), but the Pact Government seems to have acted with 
considerable autonomy (Martin, 1990), and seems to have been motivated 
strongly by the goal of increasing employment opportunities for white workers 
outside of the mines. Tariffs helped employers cope with the higher cost of 
employing white labour, and were thus a political necessity even if they resulted 
in a degree of inefficiency. The state also sought to modernise agriculture 
through agricultural extension services, training, and irrigation projects, 
although with little obvious effect on the consistently sluggish growth of 
agricultural output.  Manufacturing overtook agriculture in terms of value-added 
just before the outbreak of the Second World War (and overtook mining soon 
after).   
 
                                                                                                                                                        




The Union‟s industrial policies, like many other areas of public policy, reflected 
both a growing nationalist impulse and a concern to emulate other British 
dominions, notably Australia. Building a parastatal steel industry was especially 
attractive to the Pact Government because it promised to make South Africa 
more independent of the British capital that controlled the mines, and would 
enable South Africa to catch up with the other dominions which had already 
established their steel industries. Industrial policy also enabled the state to 
intervene to achieve social objectives. The Pact Government used its 
investments to promote employment and high wages for white workers. Indeed, 
the bill establishing ISCOR initially provided for direct control of ISCOR‟s 
labour policies by the cabinet, which initially imagined an all-white workforce 
(Clark, 1994; Cross, 1993). The railways served as an additional source of 
employment of white people, especially under the Pact Government.  
 
 
4. Institutions and wages 
 
In the period of economic stagnation lasting from Union to the gold-fuelled 
growth of the mid-1930s, the state built capacity to intervene in almost every 
facet of the economy. It operated the transport system, provided power, ran the 
steel industry and set tariffs to nurture other manufacturing. It collated statistics, 
raised new taxes, and managed the currency. It intervened in the labour, housing 
and agricultural produce markets. It provided income support through a nascent 
welfare state. And, of course, it acted to maintain an adequate supply of cheap, 
African labour to mines and farms. The state did these things not simply to 
promote economic growth, or to assist capitalists in earning profits. The state 
sought also to structure the distribution of earnings and incomes in society, 
raising the earnings and incomes of a privileged, and generally racially-defined, 
minority. In establishing institutions that maintained wages and incomes at 
„civilised‟, „fair‟ or „European‟ levels, it constructed a high-wage institutional 
framework that would endure through the apartheid era and into post-apartheid 
South Africa, with enormous consequences for poverty and inequality.  
 
In the early decades of the Twentieth Century, and for diverse reasons, 
immigrant white workers, poor Afrikaans workers abandoning the countryside, 
and those members of the political or economic elite who were either 
sympathetic or racist or both, all sought to maintain the standard of living for 
white South Africans at a level commensurate with those in Australia and New 
Zealand, and as high if not higher than in Britain. The high wages prevalent in 
Britain, Australia and New Zealand – high, that is, relative to other countries – 
were replicated in South Africa, albeit only for white workers.  In almost every 
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area of public policy, Australia and New Zealand provided role models for 
South African policy makers and interest groups. From the 1890s, Australia and 
New Zealand adopted legislation providing for settling industrial disputes, 
progressive income taxation, tariff protection of domestic industries, a Ministry 
of Labour, restrictions on non-European immigration, and, first in New Zealand 
and later in Australia, old-age pensions and other welfare reforms. Workers with 
experience in Australia held prominent positions in the South African labour 
movement. Intellectuals, bureaucrats and politicians alike paid careful attention 
to their Australasian counterparts.  
 
In 1913, amidst escalating industrial conflict, the government appointed the 
Chapman (Economic) Commission to investigate wages, the cost of living, and 
costs of production. The commission found that artisans earned much higher 
wages in South Africa than in Britain.  It also found that the cost of living for 
(white) working-class South Africans was much higher than in Australia, Britain 
and elsewhere – in part because expenses such as a domestic worker and a large 
house were deemed to be needs in South Africa but would be considered 
luxuries in Australia or Britain. The Commission reported that „social 
convention‟ required that white men and women enjoy a standard of living 
superior to that of „non-white‟ people. In terms of actual purchasing power, 
South African artisans were better paid than their British, European or American 
counterparts (South Africa, 1914). 
 
The Chapman Commission adopted a broadly pro-employer perspective, and 
opposed minimum wage-setting for workers in general and the establishment of 
wage boards in particular. The Commission was opposed to the colour bar and 
argued that a more flexible labour-market was needed to reduce excessive skill 
differentials and contain escalating production costs, which would otherwise 
result in retrenchment and unemployment. It was not entirely opposed to 
regulation, however, recommending that trade unions be recognized, working 
conditions be regulated, and voluntary conciliation boards be established for 
industrial disputes.  The government did indeed introduce a battery of such 
regulatory legislation. 
 
Just over ten years later, in the aftermath of the Rand Revolt, the government 
shifted the emphasis of policy towards direct intervention in wage 
determination. In the 1924 elections, the National and Labour parties denounced 
the incumbent government for promoting „big financial‟ interests and 
jeopardizing the future of (white) South Africans „as a civilised people‟. 
National Party leader Barry Hertzog emphasized the threat to South Africa 
remaining „a white man‟s country‟, and called for a skeidsmuur (literally, a 
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dividing wall) between „civilized‟ and „uncivilized‟ labour. The resulting Pact 
Government, with Hertzog as Prime Minister, quickly committed itself to a 
„Civilized Labour Policy‟ as part of its segregationist programme. 
The Prime Minister desires it to be understood by all Departments of 
State that it has been decided as a matter of definite policy that, 
wherever practicable, civilized labour shall be substituted in all 
employment by the Government for that which may be classified as 
uncivilized. Civilized labour is to be considered as the labour rendered 
by persons, whose standard of living conforms to the standard 
generally recognized as tolerable from the usual European standpoint. 
Uncivilised labour is to be regarded as the labour rendered by persons 
whose aim is restricted to the bare requirements of the necessities of 
life as understood among barbarous and undeveloped peoples.‟ (Prime 
Minister‟s Circular no.5, quoted in Official Year Book, v.9: 203). 
The policy applied initially to government departments only, and was later 
extended to manufacturing (but not mining, which even the Pact Government 
treated with great caution – Yudelman, 1983). The Government also adopted a 
„fair wage policy‟ which required government contractors to pay „fair wages‟ to 
their white employees.  
 
The following year, the Pact Government appointed an Economic and Wage 
Commission with a brief to investigate the effects of different wage and labour 
policies on employment „at a wage compatible with a civilized standard of life‟. 
The six commissioners were unable to agree on their findings, and divided into 
two groups of three, each group authoring a different report. The contrast 
between the two reports reveals two very different approaches to the 
organisation of production in South Africa, with profound consequences for 
poverty and inequality in both the short- and (through the effects of the cost 
structure on the economic growth path) long-term.  The debate between these 
competing approaches continued throughout the rest of the century. 
 
The report of the three members headed by the chairperson of the Commission, 
Mills, found that skilled (white) workers were earning high wages, whilst 
unskilled (African) workers were being paid low wages, in comparison to their 
counterparts in Britain and Australia. The ratio of skilled to unskilled workers‟ 
wages in construction or engineering on the Witwatersrand was about 5:1, 
compared to (at most) 1.5:1 in Britain (South Africa, 1926: 19). In London, a 
bricklayer was paid one-third more than a labourer in construction, and the 
difference was even less in Melbourne or Sydney. On the Witwatersrand, 
bricklayers were paid almost double their counterparts in London, and more 
even than in the Australian cities, whilst African labourers were paid less than 
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one-third of what their British and Australian counterparts were paid (ibid: 24-
25). The Mills Report recorded that the cost of living on the Witwatersrand was 
higher than in London, but even taking this into account, real wages for skilled 
white workers were about one-third higher than in London, and were very much 
higher than in most parts of Europe. One of the mining companies submitted to 
the Commission that „the average white miner on the Rand is less skilful, does 
less effective work, and receives nearly double the pay‟ of a Californian gold-
miner (although the cost of living for married men was higher in Johannesburg 
than in California); much of the work done by white workers was supervisory, 
and the supervision often cost more than the work being supervised (ibid: 243).  
 
The wages paid to skilled, white workers were very much higher than the wages 
paid to African workers, but the latter were not especially low in global terms.  
African labour was „cheap‟ in comparison to unskilled labour in Britain, but was 
not cheap in comparison to other parts of the world. The low wages paid to 
African labourers on the Witwatersrand were much the same as the wages paid 
to labourers in Italy and some other parts of Europe (South Africa, 1926; 
Feinstein, 2005: 134). Alexander finds that African coal-miners were paid 
double what their counterparts in India earned in the 1930s; the South African 
mines were much more capital-intensive, and average labour productivity was 
between three and five times higher (Alexander, 2007). African labour was 
considered „cheap‟ in South Africa because wages were low compared to the 
wages paid in Britain or to white workers in South Africa, not by broader global 
comparisons.  
 
High wage-rates in South Africa were an issue because, as Mills et al. 
understood clearly, South Africa was not a correspondingly affluent country, 
despite the value of its gold-mining. „South Africa at present is not among the 
richest countries in the world… The aggregate capacity of industry to pay wages 
is of the same order of magnitude as that of Germany and Italy rather than of 
Australia or North America‟ (ibid: 33). Skilled workers on the Witwatersrand 
could be paid high wages, Mills et al. argued, only because they comprised a 
small minority of the workforce, and did so „at the expense‟ of low-paid African 
workers (ibid: 86-7). The Mills Report argued that reducing wage differentials 
would be good for productivity, but would require lower wages for skilled white 
workers as well as higher wages for the unskilled. Mills and his colleagues were 
opposed to protecting employment for white workers through either a colour bar 
or the imposition of high minimum wages across the board. They pointed out 
also that protected employment on the railways served to disguise the real costs, 
 
18 
because these could be passed onto either consumers (because the railways had a 




The other three members of the Commission, headed by Lucas, adopted a very 
different approach to assessing the wages paid to white workers. They expressed 
skepticism about international comparisons of wages (and prices), in part 
because, in their view, the average white worker in South Africa was more 
skilled than the average worker in (for example) London. But their primary 
arguments were that skilled white workers‟ wages had not risen in relation to the 
growth of national income and, drawing on the Australian precedent, that wages 
were insufficient for a family of five (or more). „To maintain a white civilization 
in South Africa the white workers must receive a civilized wage‟ (ibid: 352). 
They complained about the large sums paid in dividends and interest to 
„overseas capitalists‟ (ibid: 306) and about the high rents charged by local 
landlords. In their view, all workers (including African workers) should be paid 
higher wages, which (they suggested) would stimulate demand and hence 
economic growth.
6
 The employment on the mines of low-wage labour from 
outside the Union (especially from Mozambique) should be stopped because it 
depressed the wages paid to „native‟ (i.e. African) workers. If unskilled wages 
were higher, then there would be more immigration of unskilled white workers, 
as there was into Australia or the USA. This would help to turn around the 
current situation of having „a small minority of civilized Europeans among a 
vast majority of uncivilized natives‟ (ibid: 353). „The immigration of civilized 
Europeans would strengthen European civilization in South Africa‟, they 
concluded; „the importation of uncivilized non-Europeans will assist to swamp 
it‟ (ibid: 356).  Logically, industry should be reorganized to employ a higher 
proportion of white workers. The implicit ideal was the creation of a new South 
Africa in the image of „white‟ Australia, with low-waged African workers 
largely excluded from all urban and industrial occupations excepting domestic 
work. 
 
The Mills Report was opposed to the extension of wage agreements to non-
parties. The 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act allowed for agreements on wages 
reached between employers and unions in industrial councils to be extended to 
firms and workers who had not participated in the actual negotiations. The first 
                                                 
5
 The Mills Report included a detailed discussion of the economics of gold-mining, and of the 
obstacles to expanding high-wage white employment. This may have informed the Pact 
Government‟s unwillingness to intervene in the mining industry.  
6
 High wages were also described as „an incentive to more efficient management‟ (such that 
„public wage regulation is in the interest of the better class of employers‟) and as a stimulant 
to higher productivity (ibid: 354). 
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two industrial councils established nationally were in the printing and building 
industries. Bargaining in these two councils led to a Printing and Newspaper 
Industry agreement that was imposed countrywide and a Building Trades 
agreement that imposed minima in selected rural districts. The Mills Report was 
sharply critical of this: „Even in large centres – Bloemfontein and Kimberley – 
evidence was put before us to the effect that the gazetting of the new rates led to 
the dismissal of some workers and to evasion of the agreement‟, whilst „it is 
manifestly unwise‟ to apply the same minimum wages to small towns (ibid: 57). 
The Lucas Report, however, was disparaging about the jobs lost when higher 
wages were imposed: these were coloured workers whose productivity was too 
low for the higher wages, and who were clearly dispensable in the noble cause 
of paying „civilized‟ wages to „civilized‟ workers (ibid: 290-1).  
 
The perversity of the case for higher „civilised‟ wages is clear when one 
considers the position of domestic workers. The Mills Report includes an 
extended discussion of the presumed need for „civilised‟ labour to employ a 
domestic „servant‟. Indeed, provision for such a servant was integral to the 
notion of a „fair wage‟ for civilized workers (ibid: 172-87). Yet, inevitably, the 
sum provided for in a „fair wage‟ for white workers for the cost of a domestic 
servant (see Lucas Report, ibid: 332-3) certainly did not constitute a „fair‟ wage 
for the servant himself (domestic work still being a largely male preserve), 
because of course the servant was an „uncivilized‟ African or coloured person. 
In practice, the institutional apparatus of wage determination as demanded by 
Lucas et al. was fundamentally racist, deepened inequalities in earnings, and 
ensured that employers had a major incentive to acquiesce in the exclusion of 
African workers from the institutions that ensured high wages for „insiders‟. 
 
The debates around wage-setting were mirrored by debates over the state‟s first, 
bold steps towards building a welfare state. The Pact Government‟s enthusiasm 
for old-age pensions – for insider white and coloured men and women – was in 
substantial part due to a concern to restore the racial income hierarchy. For the 
Pact Government, racial segregation entailed both excluding and repressing 
African people and elevating white people, including through „civilized labour 
policies‟, land settlement policies in the countryside, and welfare reform. The 
political imperative was explained by an NP Member of Parliament, Dr. Stals, in 
August 1924. The „poor white‟ problem, he said: 
is a question which not only concerns the poor; it affects the whole 
white civilization of this country. It confronts us with the question 
whether we, the descendents of the staunch old pioneers, will maintain 
their civilisation and hand it over to our children… It may be asked 
whether there is poverty only in South Africa and whether other 
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countries do not suffer from the same thing. There are poor people 
everywhere, but the circumstances in South Africa are unique… In 
this country, there is a small number of whites against the natives, a 
few civilized people against uncivilised hordes, and for that reason it 
is so important that not a single white person should be allowed to go 
under…  There is no greater problem than this, because the existence 
of the European civilisation in this country hinges on it. 
The Pienaar Commission into welfare reform found that „Many aged and infirm 
people are living under conditions which are unworthy of a civilised 
community‟ (South Africa, 1927: 10).  
 
The Pact Government, influenced heavily by arguments such as those made by 
Lucas et al. in 1925, constructed a set of wage-setting and poverty-relieving 
institutions and policies that were focused on replicating British and Australian 
levels of „civilised‟ earnings and incomes.  In South African conditions, these 
could only be sustained if the majority of the population were systematically 
excluded from coverage. After the collapse of the Pact Government, government 
commissions emphasised more emphatically the inefficiencies arising from a 
system in which white workers were paid wages as high as, or higher than, their 
counterparts in high-wage economies (such as the USA, UK and Australia) 
whilst African workers were confined to unskilled occupations and were paid 
wages as low as their counterparts in lower-wage economies (across much of 
Europe, for example) (South Africa, 1935; see also Year Book v.17, 1934-35: 
243; see also Feinstein, 2005: 132-5). 
 
Whilst wage differentials were reduced during the post-depression boom, the 
notion of a high „civilised‟ wage or income level proved intractable. When 
Batson conducted his pioneering work on poverty in Cape Town in 1938-40, he 
defined the poverty line in terms that reflected the racialised assumptions that 
predominated at the time. His poverty line entailed sufficient food to meet needs 
„taking into account the established food customs of the Western World‟, and 
sufficient clothing to meet the „minimum compatible with health and conformity 
with Western customs‟ (Batson, 1941: 1). This was, he emphasised, „the barest 
minimum upon which subsistence and health can be achieved under Western 
conditions‟ (ibid). Housing posed a particular problem, given that racialised 
norms meant that poor white and even coloured people did not live in areas 
where the cost of housing was lowest. Batson‟s way around this problem was to 
compare each household‟s income net of actual housing costs to a poverty line 
defined exclusive of housing costs (ibid: 2). Similar allowance was made for the 
actual expenses incurred in transport to and from work. What this meant is that 
households might be deemed poor in part because they chose to spend more 
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money on housing than they might have done in a less segregated setting. In 
short, Batson set a poverty line that made some sense with respect to the 
standard of living expected by and for people like the (white) workers who had 
migrated from Britain to South African cities. 
 
The state – even under the Pact Government – remained dependent on the gold-
mining companies, and helped supply the mines with large numbers of unskilled 
African men to work for low wages (Jeeves, 1985; Yudelman, 1993; Crush, 
Jeeves and Yudelman, 1991). But the state, especially under the Pact 
Government, was also electorally and ideologically committed to the 
maintenance or improvement of white standards of living, and skilled, white 
workers were powerful enough to secure institutions through which they could 
advance or protect their interests, especially in the fast-growing manufacturing 
and service sectors. For white workers this was a period of remarkable 
achievement.  The Labour Party not only entered government (in 1924), but 
union representatives also participated in the deliberations over the global 
regulation of work at the International Labour Conferences in Geneva.  The 
price of success, however, was the oppression of African workers. Whilst 




5. Poverty amidst stagnation 
 
Through most of the twentieth century poverty was only regarded as a „problem‟ 
insofar as it involved white people.  „Poor whites‟ had been identified as a 
„problem‟ in the late nineteenth century (Bundy, 1986), but their conditions – 
and the causes of their poverty – were more fully documented in the early 
twentieth century (especially South Africa, 1926: 105-20, 334-50; Macmillan, 
1930; the Carnegie Commission, 1932). The sub-division of small farms into 
unsustainably smaller and uncompetitive units drove unskilled white workers 
onto urban labour markets in which they were unable to compete with African 
workers.  The erosion of support by kin for those who were unable to work on 
grounds of age, infirmity or ill-health, domestic workload or unemployment 
deepened vulnerability. If too many sank into „apathetic indigency‟, living with 
or even below the „non-European majority‟, then white people could not 
maintain their position as a „dominant race‟ (in the words of the Transvaal 
Indigency Commission of 1908, quoted in Lewis, 1984: 25).  The government 
responded primarily through racially-discriminatory job reservation and 
minimum wage-setting, aimed primarily at ensuring that white men of working 
age earned enough to support themselves and their dependents. During the Great 
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Depression, which coincided with drought on the South African platteland, the 
state operated massive public works programmes to prevent mass 
unemployment among white working-age men.  In addition, the state provided 
direct financial assistance to people who were unable to work (due to age, 
disability or gender) and whose kin failed to support them. 
 
The state‟s response to the „poor white problem‟ was important because it 
framed subsequent debates about poverty in society as a whole.  It became 
widely accepted in the early twentieth century that „white poverty‟ required 
redress through systematic state interventions in, primarily, the labour market 
and welfare state. By the 1940s, the state had developed institutions and policies 
that had both the intent and effect of ensuring that one category of people (the 
„white‟ population) maintained a minimum „civilised‟ standard of living, in part 
so as to maintain a clear hierarchy between them and the rest of the population 
(i.e. African people especially), and which was dependent on this very same 
hierarchy. Both the elevated incomes deemed acceptable for „insiders‟ and the 
callous disregard for the welfare of „outsiders‟ were to remain core features of 
public institutions and policy under and even after apartheid.  
 
In relation to the poverty line implicit in the concept of the „civilized‟ standard 
of living that applied to white South Africans, almost all African people were 
poor – precisely because civilized standards were set so as to ensure the 
maintenance of a clear racial income hierarchy. When means-tested old-age 
pensions were introduced for white people, both the value of the pension itself 
and the income limit used in the means-test were higher than the earnings of 
most African working people.  When, approximately ten years later, Batson 
applied his poverty line to household income data from Cape Town, he found 
that only a small minority of white households were poor, compared to one half 
of coloured households and almost all African households (Batson, 1942; see 
also Davie, 2005: chapter 3). 
 
Poverty among the African majority (or the coloured and Indian minorities) was, 
however, rarely acknowledged. As W.M.Macmillan noted in 1930, most white 
South Africans were „amazingly ignorant of the true state of the Natives in their 
midst‟ (1930: 117).  The 1904 Transvaal Labour Commission reported that „the 
African native tribes are, for the most part, primitive pastoral or agricultural 
communities, who possess exceptional facilities for the regular and full supply 
of their animal wants, and whose standard of economic needs is extremely low 
… The only pressing needs of a savage are those of food and sex, and the 
conditions of native life in Africa are such that these are as a rule easily 
supplied‟ (quoted in Davie, 2005: 53).  Over time, these kinds of blatantly racist 
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statements gave way to the more subtle explanations characteristic of 
segregationist thought. The Native Economic Commission infamously reported 
in 1932 that: 
… the poverty of individuals which occurs among Europeans is not 
common among Natives. Their communal system cares for all its 
people. Broadly speaking there is no starvation because each man will 
share his food with others. This is the explanation of so very little 
having been needed from public funds in the way of poor relief for 
Natives, despite the low standard of living of large numbers of them. 
… Such poverty as exists, therefore, applies to the whole of the 
community among which it occurs… (South Africa, 1932: 142, para 
998-9) 
African people could be excluded from benefits under the 1937 Children‟s Act 
because „under Native law it is the natural duty of the head of the kraal or 
guardian-at-law to support any minor belonging to his kraal or under his care‟. 
Indeed, „the granting of maintenance by the State will probably lead to an 
evasion of the responsibility resting upon the Natives under their own customs‟ 
(quoted in South Africa, 1940a: 64).  
 
Even these sources acknowledged that these generalizations were not entirely 
valid. The Native Economic Commission noted that „urban conditions are 
beginning to break down the communal traditions, and instances were quoted to 
us of Natives who found it necessary to hide what food they have, because 
sharing would tend to leave them without the necessaries for their own 
subsistence‟.  The Commission added that „many magistrates‟ reported a need 
for poor relief funds for poor black people in their areas (South Africa, 1932: 
143). One member of the commission wrote a dissenting report in which he 
argued that poverty was widespread and worsening in many of the „reserves‟, 
such that most men were compelled to migrate for wage employment. Other 
government inquiries agreed that poverty was worsening. The 1937 Page 
Committee, which investigated poor relief, agreed that „the spirit of family and 
clan responsibilities which is ingrained in tribal custom‟ did serve to mitigate 
poverty, „save in times of general distress, but it is evident that the ability if not 
the willingness of the kraal to maintain its helpless members is decreasing and 
that provision for these will have to be made on an increasing scale by the 
community in general‟ (meaning South African society as a whole) (South 
Africa, 1937a:15-16). 
 
Natural disasters caused extraordinary distress but few deaths. In 1911, for 
example, drought beset the Pondoland districts of the Transkei. The following 
year, East Coast fever killed as many as three-quarters of the cattle, hampering 
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transport as well as ploughing. In the face of escalating grain prices, the state 
intervened to facilitate transport and the mines were (eventually) persuaded to 
increase the cash advance offered to newly-recruited mineworkers. On this 
occasion, as on most others when drought or pests caused famine, few adults 
actually starved (Beinart, 1982: 70-76; Wylie, 2001: 64-73). Similarly, during 
the devastating famine across much of the Eastern Cape during 1945-46, the 
Department of Public Health‟s officer in charge of nutrition reported after a 
series of visits to the affected areas that „I saw no children dying of actual 
hunger or starvation‟, and concluded that „it is more a question of chronic 
malnutrition or lack of proper and enough food than one of actual famine and 
starvation‟ (quoted in Wylie, 2001: 84). Such assessments belittled the suffering 
that existed on a wide scale, and excused the limited activities undertaken by the 
state. At the same time, they reflected an important truth: the consequences of 
drought were mitigated by continued remittances from migrant workers. Put 
another way, the factors that propelled as many as one in three adult men of 
working age to migrate routinely to the mines or other employment served to 
ensure that a cash income flowed into rural areas even as or when drought or 
pestilence reduced production. 
 
Severe poverty remained exceptional because most African people either 
continued to have access to land or could take advantage of expanding 
opportunities for wage employment. Land was relatively plentiful given that the 
total population of South Africa at the beginning of the Twentieth Century was 
just one-tenth of its level at the century‟s end. African people might have owned 
little of the land, but they had access to a lot more as tenants or sharecroppers on 
land owned by white farmers. In the course of the century, this access was 
slowly but inexorably stifled, through a combination of ecological denudation, 
population growth, punitive and racist legislation including forced removals, and 
the changing economic interests of white landowners. In the mid-1920s, W.M. 
Macmillan found that people in Herschel district in the Eastern Cape were 
dependent on the earnings of migrant workers to purchase imported grain, and „a 
huge proportion of the community‟ existed „on the very lowest level of bare 
subsistence‟ (Macmillan, 1930: 185). Access to land worsened after the 1913 
Natives‟ Land Act, which not only prohibited the purchase of land by African 
people outside of tightly demarcated areas, but also criminalized sharecropping. 
Although exemptions enabled labour tenancy to continue in some areas, and 
continued illegal sharecropping was tolerated in others, the Act marked an 
important tightening of the squeeze on successful African farmers, accelerating 
processes of deagrarianisation and proletarianisation. Sol Plaatjie‟s Native Life 
in South Africa documented the effects of the Act on hitherto prosperous African 
farmers in the Orange Free State and Cape Province (Plaatjie, 1916/2007).  
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As access to or the productivity of land declined, so access to employment 
became more and more important. Men migrated to work regardless of the 
weather and harvest precisely – and despite low wages, dangerous working 
conditions (especially down the mines) and separation from families – because 
smallholder agricultural production was almost never and nowhere sufficient to 
meet the needs of growing rural populations (Macmillan, 1930; Schapera, 1934). 
At the same time, however, the strong demand for unskilled labour meant that, 
for most of this period, severe poverty seems to have been limited to episodes of 
natural disaster. The demand for unskilled labour chronically exceeded the 
domestic supply, such that the goldmines recruited a large part of their 
workforce in southern Mozambique (and even further afield) and farmers 
resorted to child labour in response to labour shortages (Beinart and Delius, 
1986: 36). Indeed, one of the reasons why farmers were often hostile to the state 
providing emergency relief in times of famine was that they thought that relief 
would stiffen workers‟ resolve not to work for the low wages offered on farms. 
Wylie quotes the leader of farmers in part of the Eastern Transvaal who, faced 
with a famine and state intervention, complained about the „pusillanimous 
petting of the natives‟ and „encouraging the natives in indolence and evasion of 
man‟s duty to labour‟ (quoted in Wylie, 2001: 76).  
 
In these circumstances, the very poor were generally not people with access to 
employment, but rather people who were unable to work and who could no 
longer count on employed kin for support. In April 1933, one of the councillors 
in the Transkeian Bunga (i.e. assembly) urged that old age pensions should be 
extended to „natives‟: 
When a man is still young he is able to support himself. Sometimes 
when he gets old he has no one to support him. He has nothing, and he 
cannot even work with his hands. Then he lives a pitiful life. He 
cannot feed himself, he cannot plough. That is why Government is 
requested to grant pensions to aged Natives.
7
 
The government did not heed this request. Poverty, in official eyes, was a matter 
only of civilised peoples unable to afford a civilised lifestyle. 
 
 
6. Economic boom, 1933-1945  
 
Whilst South Africa was not immune to the Great Depression, its economy 
recovered very rapidly and entered a period of extraordinary growth, even after 
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 Councillor R.Duze (Umzimkulu), Proceedings of the Transkeian Bunga, 11
th




war broke out in 1939.  In only twelve years, between 1933 and the end of the 
Second World War in 1945, GDP per capita almost doubled in real terms (i.e. 
accounting for inflation). Manufacturing grew especially rapidly, in part due to 
increased government expenditure and planning, and in part to the relaxation of 
some of the racial restrictions in the labour market.  Rising wages for African 
workers and the expansion of the welfare state to cover some African people 
meant that racial inequalities diminished. 
 
Gold exports pulled the economy out of the depression with extraordinary speed 
in 1933. At the end of 1932, after costly prevarication, South Africa finally 
abandoned the gold standard, which led to the depreciation of the exchange rate. 
This combined with an increase in the global dollar price of gold in 1934 to raise 
considerably the local proceeds of gold sales. The sudden increase in the mines‟ 
revenues prompted the government to introduce a tax on these windfall gains, 
resulting in a rapid increase in government expenditure. Between 1932 and 
1939, total industrial employment (including on the railways) rose from 555,000 
to 929,000 (Houghton, 1971: 33-4). 
 
The boom continued through the Second World War.  Unlike most countries, 
South Africa experienced little economic disruption. Gold production, which 
amounted to one-third of global production in 1939, was maintained and even 
expanded during the war, despite persistent labour shortages. This, together with 
an increase in the price of gold over the period, largely covered the costs of the 
war (Richards, 1949: 149). The strong supply of foreign exchange enabled 
South Africa to repay foreign-owned debt.  „Our territory has been spared the 
ravages of war‟, declared Jan Hofmeyr, the Minister of Finance, in his budget 
speech in 1946. „As a state, we have ceased to be a foreign borrower. Our 
foreign exchange reserves are soundly invested in a sufficient gold reserve. Our 
ability to buy from the world the goods which we do not produce at home is not 
limited, as is the case with so many war torn countries, by a lack of 
internationally acceptable money‟ (Hansard, 28
th
 February 1946, 15, 2642).  
War conditions allowed the Government to increase taxes on individuals and 
companies (Lieberman, 2003: 138-44). Government revenues grew by an 
average of 11.1 percent p.a. in real terms between 1939 and 1945.  Government 
expenditures rose by only 10.6 percent p.a., allowing the Government to run a 
budget surplus every year during the war, and to use this to reduce debt 
(Nattrass, 2005).  Thus, while South Africa‟s allies (especially Britain) ran large 
deficits and borrowed money during the war, South Africa accumulated 
substantial gold reserves and repaid government and private debt (Garmany, 




The war years also saw a major expansion of state economic planning in South 
Africa, as in Britain and elsewhere. An Industrial and Agricultural Requirements 
Commission (IARC) was appointed in 1940 to facilitate an efficient 
mobilisation of resources during the war. An Industrial Development 
Corporation was established in 1940 „to facilitate, promote, guide and assist in, 
the financing of: a) new industries and industrial undertakings; and b) schemes 
for the expansion, better organisation and modernisation of and the more 
efficient carrying out of operations in existing industries and industrial 
undertakings‟ (quoted in Richards, 1940: 340).  Prices and wages were closely 
regulated. In 1942, a Social and Economic Planning Council (SEPC) was 
established to provide more informed advice on policy (although its actual role 
in the formulation of policy was unclear) (Robertson, 1954: 106). 
 
Sustained state support combined with high war-time demand and the lack of 
import competition to ensure that manufacturing industry continued to grow 
strongly (Richards, 1940; Frankel, 1947). At the start of the war, South Africa‟s 
engineering industry comprised little more than „mine and Railway 
Administration repair shops plus certain fabricating firms, chiefly on the Reef‟ 
(Richards, 1940: 344) with little capacity for high specification fabrication.  For 
some time the only factory which could manufacture rifle cartridges was the 
South African Mint (which switched its production from coins to ammunition at 
the start of the war).  By the end of the war, in contrast, South Africa had 
developed a domestic machine tool industry and substantial manufacturing 
capacity.  The manufacturing share of GDP rose from 12 to 19 percent between 
1939 and 1949.  
 
Foremost among the „resources‟ that needed to be mobilised efficiently was 
labour.  The IARC and subsequent SEPC adopted the arguments made in the 
1926 Mills Report (of the Economic and Wage Commission) and largely 
endorsed in the 1934 Industrial Legislation Commission: The colour bar should 
be relaxed; coloured, Indian and African workers should be permitted to do 
more skilled work; and wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers 
should be reduced. The costs of not doing these things would have been 
enormous, given that 200,000 white men out of a labour force of 790,000 
volunteered for military service (Siebert, 1975: 53) and the available supplies of 
„emergency workers‟ (women and unemployed artisans) were quickly 
exhausted. 
 
The consequences were dramatic, over a short period.  In manufacturing, the 
wage share rose at the expense of profits, and the racial wage gap shrank 
dramatically. The employment of African workers in manufacturing rose by 
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almost 8 percent per year during the war and their real wages increased 
primarily because of reduced skill differentials but also through upward 
occupational mobility (South Africa, 1951: 47). War-time emergency 
regulations allowed employers to engage (and train) black workers for jobs 
normally occupied by whites (Guenault, 1940: 393-4). Employers took 
advantage of the situation to restructure the labour process through 
mechanisation and deskilling (Spandau, 1972; Webster, 1985: 57). In firms 
investigated by the Wage Board between 1937 and 1946, only one in three semi-
skilled jobs were filled by white workers (South Africa, 1948: 47). Wage 
differentials declined through direct state intervention.  The Wage Board, which 
until the mid-1930s had been concerned primarily with protecting white 
workers‟ standard of living through setting high („civilised‟) minimum wages 
for semi-skilled and skilled workers, turned its attention to the wages paid to 
unskilled, African workers (Griffiths and Jones, 1980: 98).  In its 1941 annual 
report, the Board described unskilled wage-rates as „insufficient for the 
maintenance of a healthy existence‟, and described at length (and endorsed) the 
Australian concept of a „living wage‟ for unskilled workers.  Employers‟ ability 
to pay was „relatively less important where the wages of the lower paid workers 
are concerned‟, the Board insisted: unskilled wages should rise even if it meant 
squeezing profits (South Africa, 1941: 31).  Upward pressure on wages also 
arose from militant action by African workers (Siebert, 1975; Duncan, 1995; 
Alexander, 2000). In 1942 the state provided for compulsory arbitration of 
industrial disputes. The Wage Board, as arbitrator, could resolve disputes in 
favour of unskilled workers (Siebert, 1975: 50), as well as setting higher 
minimum wages and cost-of-living allowances (Spandau, 1972: 380).  At the 
same time, the state sought to „stabilise‟ the wages of skilled, white workers 
through prohibiting strike action, regulating industries to prevent poaching of 
skilled labour, capping over-time pay and drawing white women into the labour-
force (Nattrass, 2005).   
 
Critics charged that not enough was being done.  Sheila van der Horst, for 
example, argued in 1941 that failure to make better use of black labour 
undermined the war effort: „Obviously, if we were prepared to mobilise our 
native labour resources for the industrial army, production could be increased 
enormously‟ (1941: 71). African workers continued to be denied access to the 
full technical training provided for white workers (Randall, 1942: 124).  Wage 
Board increases were unsurprisingly sometimes less than demanded by African 
trade unions, and racial discrimination remained evident (Duncan, 1995: 172-5).  
Dramatic improvements in productivity suggest, however, that there was a 
massive shift in the utilisation of labour. Moll calculated that total factor 
productivity growth between 1939 and 1945 was faster than in any other period 
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in South Africa‟s economic history (Moll, 1990: 165).  Bitter complaints at the 
time by agricultural and mining employers, and tensions between the 
Departments of Labour (which managed industrial conciliation and wage 
setting) and Native Affairs (which was primarily concerned with defending the 
migrant labour system for the mines), all suggested that the basis of „cheap‟ 
unskilled labour was significantly undermined (Duncan, 1995: 175-8). 
 
The reformism of these boom years reflected the influence of a more progressive 
conception of social justice as well as a more hard-hearted concern with 
economic efficiency. Efforts to raise unskilled wages or to assist poor, elderly 
people through old-age pensions were motivated by a strong sense that this was 
right as well as necessary. A range of South Africans were inspired by social 
policy reforms elsewhere in the world, especially in New Zealand.  A „social 
security movement‟, including leading economists and sociologists, lobbied for 
reforms along the lines of the 1942 British Beveridge Report.  Caught up in this 
idealism, the governing United Party campaigned in the 1943 election on the 
promise of a „better life for all‟ (although the party leader and Prime Minister, 
Smuts, voiced scepticism in his private correspondence) (Seekings, 2000, 2005). 
In 1944, old-age pensions were extended to African men and women, albeit with 
racially discriminatory benefits, and restrictions were relaxed on public spending 
on schools for African children.   
 
The appeal of welfare reforms did not rely on idealism alone.  State officials, 
employers (including in the Chamber of Mines) and others were anxious about 
the social and economic consequences of poverty.  As Kahn pointed out in 1942, 
the great mass of the population remained „cribbed, cabined and confined within 
the four walls of poverty, through inability to utilise fully their capacity to work‟ 
(1942: 144).  By the early 1940s, observers like Kahn were armed with far more 
extensive knowledge about poverty than hitherto.  Influenced by British research 
on poverty lines and global concern over nutrition, researchers (led by Batson) 
had begun to compare household expenditure with the cost of living for all 
sections of the urban population, and to measure malnutrition in both urban and 
rural areas. A series of studies suggested that malnutrition was stable or in 
decline within the white population but was rising within the African population 
(Wylie, 2001: ch. 5).  The Chamber of Mines, concerned over the poor health of 
the mineworkers they were recruiting in rural areas, had sent researchers to the 
Transkei to assess malnutrition and mortality trends (Fox and Back, 1937).  A 
series of studies in the 1940s documented the extent of absolute poverty in rural 
areas. A study in Natal estimated that annual incomes per capita in the reserves 
were only about £2, and on white farms about £6. Access to earnings raised the 
per capita income of African people in towns dramatically: Incomes per capita 
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in urban African „locations‟ were estimated at about £18 p.a. (Dept of 
Economics, NU College, 1949). The 1944 Lansdown Commission found that 
overpopulation relative to production in the reserves had resulted in widespread 
malnutrition and deepened dependence on migrants‟ remittances. On average, 
families in the Transkei and Ciskei only met half of their minimal needs out of 
their own agricultural production. Subsistence was „but a myth‟ for some 
households (South Africa, 1944: 17). The Social and Economic Planning 
Council concluded bluntly that: „In practically no areas do the Reserve 
inhabitants as a whole produce sufficient food for the most elementary 
requirements of health‟ (South Africa, 1946: 49).  Starvation was very rare, but 
life was nonetheless precarious for many African people in rural areas, some 
African people in urban areas, and some coloured people.   
 
Poverty was reflected in infant mortality. Whilst infant mortality among white 
babies declined from less than one in ten in the 1920s to less than one in twenty 
in the 1940s, almost one in five African babies countrywide was dying before 
the age of one in the latter decade, and even more than this in some urban areas 
((Union Year Book, 1934-35: 987; Sonnabend, 1949: 22; Mostert et al., 1998: 
table 4-5, p77).   
 
Whatever the precise trend in absolute poverty rates, poverty was widely 
perceived to be increasing by African people themselves.  Wylie suggests that 
„needs‟ were being redefined: 
Eating mielie meal without relish (a stew of meat, potatoes, onions, 
and occasionally tomatoes) could give rise to the sense of being 
hungry, of living below an acceptable level of consumption. A child 
from a poor family could feel hunger while watching a better-off child 
devour a slice of bread covered with butter and jam. People were 
growing to need sweets, whether in beverages such as heavily sugared 
tea or in cakes and jam. Foods made with sugar were losing their 
luxury status, just as they had during the European industrial 
revolution. A modern sense of hunger, one that sociologists would call 
“relative deprivation”, was being born. (Wylie, 2001: 109)  
Just as living standards in Britain and Australia helped to define poverty meant 
among white South Africans, so the latter‟s affluence served to redefine what 
was acceptable among African people in South Africa. 
 
The circumstances of war had empowered reforming technocrats, whether with 
respect to wage-determination, job reservation, influx control, or social policy.  
As soon as the war was won, the conservatism of many white voters and interest 
groups became much more significant politically, and many of the reforms of 
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the previous years were suspended or reversed. Having tolerated urbanisation 
and squatting during the war, in 1945 the government passed an Urban Areas 
Act that restored influx control, and pass law prosecutions increased. The Wage 
Board adopted a much harder line on the wages paid to unskilled, African 
workers: 
It will be to the benefit of all concerned if representatives of non-
European workers, mostly labourers, were to realize and appreciate 
that with the present economic development of the country, a general 
minimum rate of 3 pounds a week for unskilled work, which is usually 
proposed by these representatives, would be fatal to the interests of the 
country, including those of labourers‟. (South Africa, 1948a: 32) 
When African mineworkers, whose wages had fallen in real terms during the 
war, resorted to strike action in 1946, they were severely repressed by the state.  
The functional distribution of income (i.e. between capital and labour) shifted 
back in favour of profits, with the share of profits in value-added rising from 38 
percent in 1945 to 47 percent by 1950. The racial wage gap also began to widen 
again (Nattrass, 2005). It was also made much harder for African workers to 
claim unemployment insurance.   
 
The Social and Economic Planning Council, a bastion of reformism, sought to 
respond to the changing political tide. In its final report, on The Economic and 
Social Conditions of the Racial Groups in South Africa, the Council complained 
about the short-term economic irrationality of limiting the incomes of African 
people:  
Rising social and economic standards and increasing opportunities 
need not threaten the economic security of the European groups; on 
the contrary, the ill-health, ignorance and poverty of the non-
Europeans constitute a drag of immense proportions on the whole 
economy of the country, to the detriment of all races. Poor social 
conditions produce inefficiency, disease and crime, which affect the 
whole community. (South Africa, 1948b: 111) 
The Council spelt out its vision by summarising the recommendations made in 
its many previous reports. These included: the need for improved statistics; the 
enlargement and development of the reserves; the „proper settlement in planned 
townships of those Native families who form a permanent part of the urban 
population‟; improvements to agriculture; the vigorous expansion of industry 
including „mechanisation and the employment of non-Europeans as operatives‟; 
the „provision of greater opportunities for educated Non-Europeans in the Public 
Service, the Railways and Harbours administration and local authorities‟; 
compulsory education for all, „greatly increased funds for non-European, 
especially Native education‟; improved and subsidised housing for Africans; 
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food subsidies and the adoption of a comprehensive social security system (ibid: 
114-116). 
 
Any doubt about which of these competing programmes was to triumph were 
dispelled in the elections of 1948. The National Party‟s electoral victory ensured 
a return to the policies of the Pact Government, and a rejection of the more 
inclusive vision given some substance during the Second World War. Three 
years later, a new Commission of Enquiry on Industrial Legislation firmly 
rejected the SEPC‟s arguments for reducing inequalities. The (Botha) 
Commission argued not only that inequality was necessary for the survival of 
„European civilisation in Southern Africa‟ but also that this was in the interests 
of the „Native‟ (Botha Commission, 1951: 220).  This was the basis upon which 
the apartheid economy was built after 1948. 
 
 
7. Growth and stagnation under Apartheid 
 
Between 1948 and the early 1970s, the economy grew rapidly and steadily.  
Real GDP approximately tripled between 1948 and 1970. Even taking into 
account population growth, real GDP per capita almost doubled over this period.  
The strong growth of the period since 1933 was sustained. Gold-mining was 
boosted by an increased gold price due to devaluation (in 1949) and the 
subsequent opening up of the Free State goldfields. Gold production, investment 
and revenues all rose dramatically. Massive investments in agriculture, heavily 
subsidised by the state, resulted in a steady increase in output. Despite their 
strong performances, the mining and agricultural sectors were overshadowed by 
growth in the manufacturing sector. The share of GDP accounted for by industry 
– including construction and electricity as well as manufacturing – overtook the 
combined share of agriculture and mining in the 1950s, and reached 30 percent 
by the mid-1960s (Feinstein, 2005: 144, 165-72, 193-9).  In the boom decade of 
the 1960s, investment in manufacturing grew by 12 percent p.a. and real output 
by almost 9 percent p.a..     
 
This period of growth coincided with the reversal of some of the policy shifts of 
the war years. The new National Party government introduced a swathe of 
racially discriminatory legislation and policies which further protected white 
workers from competition, limited the supply of skilled African, coloured and 
Indian labour, and favoured farming and the mines over manufacturing in terms 
of access to unskilled labour.  It delivered inflated earnings and living standards 
for white South Africans, in part at the expense of black South Africans, and in 
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part at the expense of future growth, as the economy became less and less 
competitive internationally. 
 
The strong growth rate over the 1950s and 1960s was widely identified, by 
conservative, liberal and Marxist scholars, as exceptional by global standards 
(see Moll, 1991: 271-2).  Liberal commentators explained this in terms of strong 
entrepreneurship, despite restrictive government policy, whilst government and 
Marxist scholars alike attributed it the „success‟ of the very same government 
policies. In fact, as Moll pointed out, the South African economy did not 
perform exceptionally in international terms. The post-war period was the 
„golden age‟ of capitalist development globally. The South African economy 
might have been growing rapidly, and more rapidly than most of the advanced 
capitalist economies of north-west Europe, but its growth was slow in 
comparison to other similar countries.  South Africa was out-performed in the 
1950s by three-quarters of the twenty medium-sized or large middle-income 
countries that Moll examined, and by one half of them in the 1960s.  Feinstein 
(2005: 145) confirmed Moll‟s findings for a larger group of thirty countries, 
whose average growth rate of GDP per capita over the period 1950-73 was 
almost double South Africa‟s (at 4 percent p.a. compared to 2.2 percent p.a.). Du 
Plessis and Smit (2009: 34) reveal one telling additional detail to this story: 
South Africa‟s GDP per capita was at its highest relative to similar countries in 
1950; thereafter, its relative position declined.  The exceptional phase of South 
African economic growth was the period prior to 1950, not the early apartheid 
era. 
 
South Africa‟s relatively poor economic performance during this period of 
global growth is reflected in other indicators. First, even in the 1960s, gross 
capital formation was lower as a percentage of GDP in South Africa than the 
average for either lower or upper middle income countries, or for the world as a 
whole (Fedderke, 2009: 183).  Moreover, throughout the entire post-war period, 
government accounted for a substantial proportion of gross fixed capital 
formation (ibid: 184). Secondly, profit rates declined over the apartheid period 
(as we shall see below). Thirdly, productivity growth was very weak.  Moll 
calculates that total factor productivity – i.e. that part of growth that cannot be 
explained by increased use of capital or labour – rose by a meagre 0.2 percent 
p.a. in South Africa between 1950 and 1973.  In Korea and Taiwan, total factor 
productivity rose by about 3 percent p.a. across this period, and even in Brazil, 
Chile and Mexico it grew by about 2 percent p.a. (Moll, 1991: 287).  „Had South 
Africa achieved the same –unexceptional – rate of TFP growth as Brazil over 
the 1950-73 period, for example, its GDP growth rate would have been 1.9 per 
cent per annum higher, and by 1973 the economy would have been 50 per cent 
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larger‟ (ibid: 288; see also Bell, 1995).  Fourthly, South Africa failed to increase 
its exports, and accounted for a steadily declining share of world trade.  South 
Africa‟s share of global manufactured exports fell from 0.8 percent in 1955 to 
0.4 percent in 1970, whilst its share of developing country manufactured exports 
similarly fell by one half, from more than 12 percent  to about 6 percent (ibid: 
282).   
 
Economic growth declined from 5 percent p.a. in the 1960s to 3 percent p.a. in 
the 1970s and only 1.5 percent p.a. in the 1980s – which was less than the 
population growth rate, meaning that GDP per capita actually declined.  South 
Africa was not unique in experiencing economic difficulties in the 1970s or 
1980s: most of Latin America also experienced similarly slow growth.  
Changing global conditions were unfavourable.  But even during this period, 
and despite the crisis across Latin America, South Africa‟s relative performance 
deteriorated further.  Moll found that the South African growth rate remained 
below the median for his sample of twenty similar economies (Moll, 1991: 278), 
whilst Feinstein found that South African growth rate for GDP per capita after 
1973 was lower than for any of his clusters of similar countries, including not 
only European and Asian cases but also cases in Latin America and Africa 
(2005: 145; see also Du Plessis and Smit, 2009: 34).  South Africa‟s share of 
global manufactured exports fell to less than 0.3 percent, and its share of 
developing country manufactured exports fell to less than 2 percent, in 1985 
(Moll, 1991: 282).   
 
 
Figure 2: GDP growth and current account deficit 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (www.reservebank.co.za) 
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One reason why economic reason was relatively weak is that growth repeatedly 
led to balance of payments crises as exports failed to match imports and the 
current account moved into deficit (see Figure 2).  The slow growth of the 1980s 
was in part due to the negative effects on investment of the township revolt and 
general political uncertainty, which discouraged investment, whilst sanctions 
inhibited trade (exacerbating pressure on the balance of payments). But the 
political crisis was itself in part due to the economic one.  The township revolt in 
1984 was initially concentrated primarily in areas – especially the Vaal Triangle 
and East Rand – where the downturn in manufacturing had resulted in deepened 
hardship, exacerbated by drought in the countryside (Seekings, 1990).  And the 
balance of payments reflected underlying problems with the economy. 
 
One interpretation of the economy contrasts the supposed health of the economy 
in the 1950s and 1960s with the crisis of the 1980s. In this view, apartheid had 
been functional to economic growth in the earlier decades, in that the supply of 
cheap labour through the coercive mechanisms of the pass laws (and other 
policies) had ensured high profits. In the 1970s and „80s, however, the dynamics 
or contradictions of the apartheid growth model had become apparent: rising 
capital-intensity and a restricted internal market (due to the meagre purchasing 
power of poorly-paid African workers) led to the economic crisis (e.g. Saul and 
Gelb, 1981).   
 
This interpretation, however, overplays the performance of the economy during 
the global post-war boom and underestimates the economy‟s chronic economic 
weaknesses. Figures 3 and 4 show that profit rates in South Africa were on a 
trend decline from 1960, from when good data are available (and probably from 
the 1940s, using the best available data, see Nattrass, 1990, 1993). The profit 
rate in mining does fit the story of strength-to-crisis: It rose (and then fell) 
dramatically with sharp increases in the gold price, but only declined steadily in 
the 1980s. In commerce (i.e. wholesale and retail trade, catering and 
accommodation), the decline began in the late 1960s. In manufacturing, 
however, the profit rate fell steadily over the 1960s, „70s and early „80s.  
 
Apartheid was not without its short-term benefits to some employers, at some 
times, in some sectors.  Influx control and the colour-bar served to protect the 
supply of unskilled labour to farms and mines, and profitability in mining 
actually rose in the 1950s (Nattrass, 1993). This was not the case in 
manufacturing, however, due to the combination of wages rising faster than 
labour-productivity, on the one hand, and falling capital productivity on the 
other (see Figure 4). In the early 1950s, wage increases for white manufacturing 
workers were compensated for by falling wages for non-white workers.  From 
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1955, rising wages for skilled and semi-skilled for workers in all population  
 
 
Figure 3. Net Profit Rates in South Africa by Economic Sector: 1960-
2001 
Sources: Calculated from published and unpublished data from the South African Reserve 
Bank; Nattrass (1990). 
 
groups put pressure on profitability (Nattrass, 1993). By the 1970s, competition 
between producers for the limited domestic market was one factor.  Another was 
the continuing pressure on costs from new restrictions on the employment of 
African workers (including the 1967 Physical Planning and Utilization of 
Resources Act, which limited employment in certain industries and urban areas).  
Generous investment subsidies and tax breaks as well as negative real interest 
rates encouraged capital-intensification, but declining capital productivity.  State 
investment in large-scale capital-intensive projects such as SASOL exacerbated 
this trend (Kaplinsky, 1995). Between the 1960s and early 1980s, the cost of 
capital relative to labour fell by about one half, due to rising wages and negative 
real interest rates.  Even when profit rates stabilised in the mid-1980s, employment 
did not grow, perhaps because of high levels of industrial conflict. A 1991 survey 
of manufacturing employers found that „labour problems‟ were most often cited as 
the cause of the continuing drift towards capital intensity (Meintjies, 1998: 11).  
The net result was that the South African industrial sector became steadily more 
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Figure 4. Key Trends in South African Manufacturing Profitability, 1960-
2001 
Sources: Published and unpublished data from the South African Reserve Bank. 
 
The performance of manufacturing was especially important because of the 
rising share of this sector in overall production.  Under apartheid, the structure 
of the economy continued to change, from being a heavily minerals-based 
economy into one more dependent on manufacturing and services (see Figure 5). 
Between 1948 and 1989, mining‟s share of value-added fell from 19 percent to 9 
percent, whilst manufacturing‟s share rose from 11 percent to 21 percent.  The 




















































Figure 5. Structural Transformation in the South African Economy: 1947-
2001 
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The growth of manufacturing was the result of conscious government policy.  
One aspect of this was a massive public and parastatal sectors. Prior to 1948, the 
state already owned and operated the railways and harbours, electricity 
production, and the iron and steel industry.  In 1951, a South African Coal, Oil 
and Gas Corporation (Sasol) and Phosphate Development Corporation (Foskor) 
were established. An Armaments Corporation (Armscor) was established in 
1963 following the imposition of an international arms embargo against South 
Africa. Parastatals were established also in the aluminium industry (Alusaf) and 
merchant shipping (Safmarine). The state was also involved in various other 
manufacturing sectors through businesses established in whole or in part through 
its Industrial Development Corporation. By 1970, Clark concludes, „the state 
controlled the “commanding heights” of the South African economy‟, with the 
very notable exception of the mining industry (Clark, 1993: 88). State 
intervention was not limited to the parastatal sector. It played a crucial role in 
promoting Afrikaners‟ ownership of private capital. Low-wage, labour-intensive 
firms were given incentives to locate in or near to Bantustans.  And security 
considerations led to the promotion of industries such as telecommunications 
and electronics (Kaplan, 1990).  
 
More generally, the state fostered the private sector through tariffs on imports 
and, from 1948, import licensing. In the motor industry, for example, Ford and 
General Motors first established small operations in South Africa in the 1920s 
because tariffs were lower on unassembled kits and components than on fully-
assembled cars.  In the late 1940s, new controls on imports led to investments by 
British companies Leyland and Austin, and a new wave of controls in the 1960s 
led to investments by companies including the British Motor Corporation, 
Renault, Chrysler, Datsun-Nissan and Volkswagen (Duncan, 1992, 1997). The 
establishment of South African Pulp and Paper Industries (SAPPI) required 
massive initial capital investment. One of the mining houses took this „risk‟ with 
state assurances that no import licenses would be granted until SAPPI could no 
longer supply the entire local market (Feinstein, 2005: 181).  The result was that 
much of the new manufacturing production was very inefficient.  In the late 
1960s and early 1970s, it cost 50 percent more to producing a motor car in South 
Africa as in the USA (ibid: 183). 
Not being encouraged to compete internationally via exports, 
[manufacturers] settled down to enjoy internal markets and in some 
cases returns to scale could not be achieved.  Many „infant‟ industries 
seem never to have grown up and required tariffs and protection 
decades after being started. The „easy‟ stage of import substitution in 
light final and intermediate goods industries ended in the early 1960s, 
but possible shifts towards exporting light manufactures and the 
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efficient production and export of capital goods (for example mining 
machinery) did not take place. (Moll, 1991: 283) 
Manufacturing became „plump and inefficient‟ (ibid: 284), utilising resources 
„very inefficiently‟ (Joffe et al., 1995:12; see also Feinstein, 2005: 211-221). 
Industrialisation through import-substitution was a „self-inflicted wound‟ 
(Edwards and Lawrence, 2006) that undermined efficiency and dynamism in the 
economy as a whole.
8
   
 
Protected domestic markets and constraints on foreign investment encouraged 
the concentration of ownership within the private sector. Anglo-American had 
begun to expand its activities beyond gold and diamonds prior to 1948 
(acquiring chemicals manufacturer AECI through De Beers in 1929 and Union 
Steel in 1945), and continued to expand under apartheid.  In the 1960s it 
established Highveld Steel to compete with Iscor, took over Scaw Metals and 
established the Mondi paper business. In the 1970s it diversified further, 
including into automobile retailing and production, property, and banking 
(acquiring a larger share in Barclays Bank, with which it had long co-operated). 
Through various intermediaries it had a large stake in the massive Barlow Rand 
group (Innes, 1981). In the 1980s, Anglo-American took over the South African 
operations of Ford and Barclays Bank (which became First National Bank) 
when their parent companies divested. Other manufacturing interests included 
South African Breweries, Premier Milling (co-owned with Liberty Life), and 
sugar giant Tongaat-Hulett.  By 1992, Anglo controlled 34 percent of the entire 
Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) capitalization. The insurance giant 
Sanlam (16% of the JSE) and Anton Rupert‟s Rembrandt Corporation (15%) 
followed Anglo‟s lead in becoming massive conglomerates. Sanlam, for 
example, owned most of Gencor, whose interests included Genmin (in mining), 
SAPPI (in forestry), Engen (fuel distribution) and diverse manufacturing and 
financial firms. Six conglomerates – i.e. Anglo-American, Sanlam and 
Rembrandt, together with insurance companies S.A. Mutual (14%, including 
Barlow Rand) and Liberty Life (5%), and Anglovaal (3%) – together controlled a 
total of 86 percent of the JSE (Lewis, 1995).  This concentration of ownership, via 
complex cross-holdings and preferential shares, led Schneider (2008) to include 
South Africa in his list of „hierarchical market economies‟, in which the locus of 
co-ordination is the conglomerate rather than either the market or corporatist 
institutions.  
 
South Africa was not an orthodox case of industrialisation through import-
substitution (ISI). Industrialization in South Africa did not proceed simply 
                                                 
8
 Bell queried whether South Africa was more inefficient than other, similar economies (Bell, 
1995; see also Kaplan and Lewis, 1996, Bell, 1996). 
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through the sequence of, first, the development of consumption goods industries 
and subsequently, through backward linkages, intermediate and capital goods 
industries, but rather involved a mix of both this and of industrialization through 
forward linkages from the „core‟ mining-related sectors (Fine and Rustomjee, 
1998; Bell and Farrell, 1997; see also Fine and Rustomjee, 1998; Bell 1998). 
Export-oriented mining remained central to the South African economy. The 
share of mining in value-added might have declined steadily (see Figure 5 
above), but its continuing importance was evident in the early 1980s when the 




Even when the state began to encourage manufacturers to export, however, the 
South African performance was poor.   
In the 44 years between 1960 and 2004, the real value of exports grew 
by only 34 percent (about 0.7 percent per year). By contrast export 
growth was 169 percent in Argentina, 238 percent in Australia, 1887 
percent in Botswana, 385 percent in Brazil, 387 percent in Canada, 
390 percent in Chile, 730 percent in Israel, 1192 percent in Italy, 4392 
percent in Malaysia, 1277 percent in Mexico and 120 percent in New 
Zealand, to name a few relevant comparators. (Hausmann, 2008: 2) 
The failure to diversify and increase exports had two especially serious 
consequences.  First, it contributed to the structural constraint that, whenever 
growth rates improved, the current account fell rapidly into deficit (see also 
Feinstein, 2005: 224-230).  This, coupled with skills shortages, fuelled inflation 
and led to restrictive economic policies (De Kock, 1975; Hausmann, 2008). 
Secondly, employment growth was further inhibited. In the 1980s, 
manufacturing as well as mining and agriculture shed jobs (Hausmann, 2008).  
The parts of the economy whose growth came to drive the overall growth rate – 
notably finance and business services – were the most-skill intensive, whilst the 
relatively labour-intensive export sectors were disadvantaged (Hausmann, 
2008). This, in turn, aggravated the skills constraint whilst placing further 
pressure on the balance of payments (as the growing service sectors used rather 
than generated foreign exchange).  
 
 
8. The Transformation of the Labour Market  
 
Economic growth during the apartheid period – especially in the industrial and 
service sectors – was accompanied by significant change in the structure of 
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 Fine and Rustomjee (1998) err in their estimation of the size of the „minerals-energy 




employment and, consequently, in patterns of inequality and poverty (Seekings 
and Nattrass, 2005: chapter 3). Just as tractors transformed the countryside, so new 
technology and ways of organising production transformed factories, building 
sites, mines, and offices. Employers were keen to reorganise production through 
increased mechanisation not simply because the state provided strong incentives to 
mechanise and therefore employ fewer African workers, but also because they 
wanted to reduce their dependence on scarce, expensive and autonomous artisans 
or skilled workers. In South Africa, the high wages paid to skilled (white) workers, 
and persistent skills shortages, provided strong incentives to employers to 
„fragment‟ the skilled trades (occupied by white workers) into semi-skilled 
occupations (occupied by coloured, Indian or African workers).  But white artisans 
were powerful, both industrially (in the workplace, in part through their societies 
or trade unions), ideologically (as white workers) and electorally (through the 
ballot box).   
 
Although „Fordist‟ production was first introduced in South African 
manufacturing in the 1930s, at the Durban Falkirk iron foundry (Webster, 1985), 
its introduction was delayed in many sectors to the 1970s, „80s or even „90s.  
Crankshaw (1997) shows that, in general, production was transformed first and 
fastest in sectors where there were not well-organised and powerful constituencies 
of white artisans. For example, African workers moved into white-collar 
occupations in services far faster than into skilled work in manufacturing or 
mining.  In sectors where white workers were well-organised, deskilling could 
only be implemented with their consent, which meant that mass production was 
often delayed until employers could promote white artisans into better-paid 
supervisory or managerial positions.  At the level of the economy as a whole, the 
reorganisation of production in manufacturing depended in part on the growth of 
well-paid employment opportunities in services. Given the continuing power of 
(white) skilled workers, mechanisation meant not so much replacing skilled with 
semi-skilled work as replacing large amounts of unskilled labour with smaller 
amounts of semi-skilled labour. The combination of sectoral shifts – from 
industry to services – and the mechanisation of formerly unskilled work was 
evident in data on employment from the official Manpower Surveys, conducted 
between 1965 and 1992 (Crankshaw, 1997).  
 
For people with the skills, qualifications, racial classification, or pass law status 
to be able to secure employment in the expanding, better-paying classes, the 
period was one of rising prosperity. For people competing for the stagnant 
number of unskilled jobs, the period was one of continuing or deepening 
hardship.  The primary beneficiaries of economic growth and change were white. 
The white labour force became almost entirely urban and employed in white-collar 
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rather than blue-collar occupations. Among Afrikaans-speaking white workers, 
employment in agriculture fell from 30 percent in 1946 to 8 percent in 1970, 
whilst white-collar employment rose from 29 to 65 percent between 1946 and 
1977 (O‟Meara, 1996: 138). Real per capita incomes among the white population 
more than doubled in one generation (McGrath, 1990: 95), raising the demand for 
consumer goods.  
 
As semi-skilled, skilled, and white-collar employment grew in the economy as a 
whole, so most coloured and Indian workers were also able to move into better-
paying occupations (although this did not prevent forced removal under the 
Group Areas Act). Upward occupational mobility among coloured and Indian 
people was based on improved public education, at both secondary and tertiary 
levels. Urbanisation, better schooling, and rising incomes also led to improved 
health. Eberstadt notes that „hardly any other population on record‟ – i.e. anywhere 
in the world, at any time – „enjoyed such a rapid and sustained pace of 
improvement in child survival‟ as coloured South Africans between 1970 and 
1985 (1992: 160). 
 
The growing, changing economy brought huge changes for the urban African 
population also. Despite influx control, this population grew from about 2.2 
million in 1951 to 5.6 million by 1980 (Simkins, 1983). This growth was 
accompanied by change in just about every aspect of life: schooling, work, 
household structure, living conditions, culture and leisure activity, and politics. 
This urban African population also benefited from technological and economic 
change. When forklift trucks, cranes, and other handling equipment were 
introduced into factories, the African workforce in manufacturing was reduced by 
10 percent (Crankshaw, 1997: 54-7). The remaining jobs required more skill and 
were better paid. Until 1960, almost all African workers were unskilled, but by 
1980 unskilled labour accounted for less than one half of African employment in 
the Johannesburg area and less than two-thirds in other areas of Gauteng. By 1994, 
a survey of its own members conducted by the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions found that only 30 percent were classified by employers as unskilled; 30 
percent were unskilled, 21 percent skilled, 9 percent supervisory, and 10 percent 
clerical (with 5 percent classified as „other‟) (Buhlungu, 2006: 8). For better 
educated, younger African men and women, opportunities steadily improved. 
 
Even employment in gold-mining was transformed. For decades, large numbers of 
men from rural areas migrated to the mines, earned low wages, but remitted a 
share of their wages to rural kin. Many men took breaks between successive 
employment contracts, so that there was de facto job-sharing. In the late 1970s, the 
mines began to „stabilise‟ their workforce by employing a smaller pool of better-
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paid, more highly skilled workers for the long term rather than a larger number of 
less skilled workers who might work one year but not the next. The emergence of 
the „“career miner”, who had to work continuously on a particular mine or forfeit 
his job‟, meant higher wages (but perhaps poorer health) for a smaller total number 
of mine workers; the „stabilisation‟ of mine labour „shut out a whole generation of 
new work-seekers who could once have counted on a mine job, if nothing else‟ 
(Crush, 1995: 25; see also Murray, 1995). As semi-skilled replaced unskilled 
employment, total employment stagnated. 
 
Outside of mining, the new opportunities for African workers were mostly filled 
by newcomers to the labour force, i.e. upward occupational mobility was inter- 
rather than intra-generational (Schneier, 1983). This reflected the massive 
expansion in primary and, later, secondary schooling for African people under 
apartheid (notwithstanding its poor quality relative to public education for white 
people). This expansion occurred in two distinct periods. First, from the mid-1950s 
onward there was a massive increase in the provision of primary schooling for 
African children. The effect of this was to raise dramatically adult literacy rates 
among urban African people. Second, from the late 1960s (but later in urban 
areas), there began a massive expansion of secondary schooling. Secondary school 
enrollment rates among African children rose from a mere 4 percent in 1960 to 16 
percent in 1970 and 35 percent in 1980 (Pillay, 1990: 34). Secondary education 
was transformed from „the prerogative of an elite‟ into „a mass phenomenon‟ 
(Bundy, 1987: 312). In greater Soweto, for example, there were only eight 
secondary schools until 1972. By 1976 there were twenty, with three times as 
many students as in 1972. By the end of 1984 there were fifty-five secondary 
schools. There was also a marked expansion of tertiary education. In 1960 there 
were fewer than 800 African students at residential universities. By 1983 there 
were about 20,000. 
 
Not all African people enjoyed the same opportunities with respect to education 
and thus the newer, better-paying jobs. The children of the already better-off were 
advantaged relative to the children of the poor (Schneier, 1983: 45-6). The 
opening of new employment opportunities in the towns thus exacerbated emerging 
class inequalities in the African population. The large numbers of African people 
who had been removed from farms into sprawling slums in the homelands were 
for the most part denied good schooling, and had no prospect of finding well-paid 
urban employment (Murray, 1992).  
 
Employers saw the promotion of African workers into semi-skilled and skilled 
work as a way of both overcoming the shortage of white skilled labour and 
reducing labour costs. Some employers favoured extending to African workers 
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the rights enjoyed by white workers, crucially with respect to union 
representation and access to the wage- and benefit-setting industrial council 
system.  The upsurge of strike action and the formation of new „independent‟ 
trade unions (independent, that is, of the established unions dominated by white 
workers) representing mostly African workers in the 1970s encouraged 
reformists, who saw the incorporation of labour into the industrial relations 
system as preferable to chronic confrontation. Anglo-American led the reformist 
wing of business, in the face of conservatism from the other members of the 
Chamber of Mines and other manufacturers (notably in the Barlow Rand group).  
The Wiehahn Commission embraced much of the reformist agenda in its 1979 
report, recommending that unions representing African workers be recognized.   
 
The government‟s recognition of the independent unions opened up the 
possibility of their participation in the existing institutions of collective 
bargaining, i.e. the industrial councils and their counterparts in sectors such as 
mining. The industrial council system offered different benefits to different 
participants at different times.  From the perspective of the new „independent‟ 
trade unions representing mostly African workers, the white workers‟ unions 
used the councils to negotiate wage increases for themselves at the expense of 
low-paid black workers (Baskin, 1991: 256).  The established unions certainly 
used the councils to defend the colour bar, but by the 1970s the minimum wage 
rates agreed in the councils seem to have been of marginal concern to most 
white workers, because the skills shortage meant that white artisans were 
generally paid much more than the agreed minima (Friedman, 1987: 267).  
Rather, the councils served to protect white workers‟ pensions and other 
benefits. Minimum wages were, however, of value to large employers, who used 
the extension of negotiated minimum wages across entire sectors to remove the 
possibility of employers competing on the basis of lower wages.  „If agreements 
were not extended to non-parties it would, in the opinion of many employers, be 
of little use to continue negotiating on industrial councils‟ (Bendix, 1995: 492, 
quoted in Standing et al., 1996: 194). Unionists themselves recognized the 
importance of this, especially in labour-intensive industries.  For example, the 
South African Labour Bulletin noted in 1990 that it was „in the interests of the 
larger employers‟ in the contract cleaning industry „to be part of an industrial 
council, where they can set standards, wages, etc‟, because the extension of 
agreements across the whole sector meant „“fly-by-night” operators are 
prevented from undercutting the larger companies‟ (Pillay, 1990: 8).   
 
Minimum wages were of marginal interest to the established unions by the late 
1980s, but they were of great concern to the independent unions.  The prospect 
of negotiating over minimum wages and improved benefits across entire sectors, 
 
45 
rather than piecemeal at the plant level, was very attractive – as long as they 
could avoid being bureaucratized and continue to use strike action. In 1981, for 
the first time, one of the smaller new unions joined the industrial council in the 
metals industry (Friedman, 1987: 270). Anglo-American pushed employers‟ 
bodies such as the Steel and Engineering Industrial Federation of South Africa 
(SEIFSA) to open industrial councils to the new unions.  In 1983, unions 
affiliated to the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) joined 
industrial councils in the textiles and metals sectors, after employers made 
important procedural concessions to them and over-rode opposition from the 
established unions. FOSATU unions insisted on their right to organize and 
negotiate at the plant level as well as the industrial level, and backed the 
demands presented in the councils with strike action (ibid: 326-31).  As long as 
an independent union was just one of several unions on an industrial council, the 
value of participation remained muted. As the independent unions outgrew the 
established unions in terms of membership, they faced the prospect of being the 
majority unions on the councils – and of acquiring the power that came with 
this. The National Union of Mineworkers, which negotiated centrally with the 
Chamber of Mines (although without any need for an industrial council), 
provided an example. After the formation of the new union federation, the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), in December 1985, 
several major unions in both manufacturing and services identified industrial 
councils as an opportunity to advance their campaigns for a „living wage‟ 
through negotiating industry-wide minima (Baskin, 1991). The discourse of a 
„civilised‟ wage was reincarnated via the very same institutions through which it 
had been effected in a racialised form half a century earlier. 
 
COSATU‟s growing enthusiasm for the industrial councils prompted mixed 
responses among employers.  Some employers – especially in the Barlow Rand 
group – became more hostile to centralized bargaining over wages, although 
they were more willing to negotiate centrally over issues such as provident 
funds, medical aid and training.  Unions blamed the collapse in 1989 of the 
printing industrial council – one of the oldest in the country – on Barlow Rand‟s 
subsidiary Nampak. In a growing number of sectors, however, including notably 
engineering and car manufacturing, COSATU unions reached agreement with 
employers over centralized bargaining (Pillay, 1990; Baskin, 1991).   
 
The new unions reinvigorated the industrial council system, using it just as 
white workers‟ unions had used it earlier in the century, to push up minimum 
wages and to secure improved benefits and working conditions, in the face of 
economic pressures to depress wages and labour costs. Unions affiliated to 
COSATU rightly saw that the „wage gap‟ – i.e. the gap between the salaries and 
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wages paid to better-paid (mostly white) employees and the wages paid to 
unskilled workers – was very wide, and that most of their members (including 
semi-skilled as well as unskilled workers) were paid less than a „living wage‟ 
(which a union-linked service organization calculated in 1989 at R1140 per 
month (approximately $430 per month at the time). What made industrial 
councils especially attractive is that they enabled a union to neutralize the 
downward pressures on wages exerted by non-members. For most of the 
twentieth century, such downward pressure on unionized (white) workers‟ 
wages came from coloured and African workers, and the solution, negotiated in 
part in the industrial councils, was the colour bar. At the end of the century the 
pressure on unionized African workers‟ wages came from the growing numbers 
of unemployed African workers. The extension of minimum wages across whole 
sectors had the effect of preventing the survival or emergence of smaller, low-
wage, labour-intensive enterprises, and thereby contributed to the rising capital-
intensity of production and, perversely, the very unemployment that was 
threatening wages in the first place. 
 
The increase in unemployment in the last decades of apartheid was rapid and 
dramatic (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005: chapter 5). In the 1940s and 1950s, the 
economy had been plagued by chronic labour shortages (Union of S.A., 1950b: 
33-8; Van der Horst, 1949).  Workers opted for better-paying urban jobs rather 
than poorly paid, arduous, and unpleasant agricultural and mining employment, 
and even in towns they avoided the most poorly paid work (Posel, 1991: 197-8). 
Commercial farmers, unable to compete with the wages paid by urban employers, 
successfully lobbied the apartheid state to extend and tighten the pass laws to 
ensure their supply of cheap labour. In this context, the only unemployment was 
among people in town who could afford and were legally able to wait for better-
paid jobs rather than take relatively low-paid employment.  By the end of the 
1970s, however, the scale of unemployment was evident in the crowds of men 
seeking employment through rural labour bureaux or queuing outside urban 
factories. In Sekhukuneland, in 1976, „labour bureau day at the magistrates offices 
was a chilling sight as crowds of desperate men crowded around the handful of 
recruiters hoping to be amongst the tiny minority who would secure work‟ (Delius, 
1996: 147). The labour bureau at Richards Bay reported having „a thousand people 
at the gate every day‟; at Maluti the announcement of three hundred vacancies in 
1978 attracted four thousand work-seekers; and in King William‟s Town, work-
seekers flattened the fence around the labour bureaux when vacancies were 
announced (Greenberg and Giliomee, 1985: 69-72). When scholars began to 
conduct local labour market surveys in the 1970s, they invariably found that 
open unemployment among African people was both high and apparently recent 
(Maree and de Vos, 1975; Loots, 1978).  
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It is likely that widespread underemployment gave way to open unemployment 
in the early 1970s.  There are, unfortunately, no good aggregate statistics on 
unemployment over time. The official register of the unemployed excluded 
African people, whilst the population census both (mis-)classified unemployed 
African people (including as „peasant farmers‟ or „housewives‟) and excluded 
entirely those bantustans that had become „independent‟.  Knight (1977) and 
Simkins (1978, 1982, 1984b) sought to measure the „gap‟ between the total 
labour force and employment (including in peasant agriculture), i.e. the 
underutilisation of labour through either unemployment or underemployment.  
In the 1940s and 1950s, the „underemployed‟ included „idle‟ African men and 
women in town looking for better-paying work as well as African families on 
white farms and in the Bantustans who had some residual access to land. The 
aggregate employment gap seems to have widened during the 1950s but not by 
much during the 1960s or 1970s. The dramatic increase in the visibility of open 
unemployment in the early 1970s probably resulted from the shift from 
widespread underemployment (as many unskilled people worked for part but not 
all of each year) to a more dualistic labour market in which a smaller number of 
people were permanently employed, increasingly in semi-skilled, better-paid 
employment, whilst others were excluded entirely. The highest open 
unemployment rate recorded in the late 1970s – 42 percent – was in a 
resettlement area in Limehill (in KwaZulu). Such resettlement villages were 
home to the most marginalised section of the population, removed from white 
farming areas and denied access to the towns (Desmond, 1978: 14-25). 
 
By 1994, more than one-third of the African labour force indicated that they 
wanted work but could not find it. Two surveys conducted forty years apart in 
Keiskammahoek (a poverty-stricken part of the Ciskei) reveal the extent of this 
dramatic shift from labour shortage to surplus in African areas: in 1949, many 
poor households were unable to farm all of their land because they lacked labour 
(Houghton and Walton, 1952); four decades later, up to 50 percent of the labour 
force in the area was unemployed (Sperber, 1993: 19).  Apartheid policies 
created an „underclass‟ of the landless, unskilled, unemployed, concentrated in 
places like Limehill and Keiskammahoek, unwanted by farmers or on the mines, 
poorly integrated into the networks through which people might find 
employment, and without any safety-net in subsistence agriculture (Seekings 





9. Deagrarianisation and Landlessness 
 
One of the causes of unemployment and inequality was the destruction of the 
African peasantry. This was rooted in the legal dispossession of most of the land 
by white settlers, in both the British colonies and the Boer republics, in the 
nineteenth century. Despite brief periods of buoyant production for markets 
(Wilson, 1971; Bundy, 1979) and sustained struggles to retain access to land, the 
combination of racist legislation on land ownership (notably the 1913 Natives 
Land Act) and the rise of capitalism in agriculture (Morris, 1976) had 
marginalized the African peasantry in most – but not all – of South Africa by the 
1940s. 
 
But the destruction of the peasantry was completed only under apartheid.  
Sharecroppers continued to find niches in poorer corners of „white‟ South Africa 
into mid-century, as Van Onselen shows in his biography of Kas Maine. Maine‟s 
best ever harvest was in 1948-49: After paying his landlord and the twenty-five 
labourers he had employed to supplement family labour during the harvest, Maine 
earned £300 after selling his produce, the equivalent of the annual salary of a 
teacher (Van Onselen, 1996; see also Keegan, 1988). In many areas, the African 
workers employed by white farmers were also their labour tenants or retained 
rights to use some land for crops or cattle. In the African reserves, households 
were dependent on both migrant remittances and agricultural production. Indeed, 
one-third of all cattle in South Africa in the 1940s were in the reserves. Taking 
into account the more successful African labour tenants, sharecroppers, and 
farmers in the reserves, perhaps 15 percent of the total population of South Africa 
in mid-century was sufficiently involved in independent farming to warrant the 
label „peasant‟ (whilst a similar or even larger proportion, in the towns as well as 
the countryside, still aspired to this). 
 
By 1970, however, the last vestiges of an independent African peasantry were all 
but eliminated, both on white-owned farms and in the reserves. Without access to 
land, African families were unable to preserve their cattle holdings. The loss of 
land and cattle led to massive social disruption, with the effect that even rural 
society bore little resemblance to the agrarian society of the first half of the 
twentieth century.  This transformation began on white-owned farms. Buoyant 
demand for agricultural products meant that landowners sought to utilise more 
of their land themselves, while mechanisation enabled them to do so without 
relying on the oxen, ploughs, or family labour of African households. In 1946 
there were a mere 20,000 tractors in South Africa. By 1950 there were 48,000, 
by 1960 almost 120,000. The introduction of combine harvesters in the 1960s as 
well as irrigation systems and chemical weed killers further reduced 
 
49 
landowners‟ dependence on African labour. The state showed great 
determination in its assault on labour-intensive forms of production (and 
consequent dependence on African labour): Mechanisation was subsidized; 
sharecropping, already notionally illegal, was stamped out; labour tenancy 
persisted in only a few areas (De Klerk, 1984; Marcus, 1989: 58-69, 80-5; 
Schirmer, 1994; Van Onselen, 1996).  
 
Farmers declared African families to be „surplus‟ to their needs and state 
officials removed the new „surplus‟ population to the African „reserves‟. More 
than one million people, i.e. about one-third of the resident African population, 
were removed from white-owned farms to the reserves (Platzky and Walker, 1985: 
10-1), and the proportion of the total African population living in rural areas 
outside the reserves fell from about 35 percent in 1950 to about 25 percent in 1970 
(Simkins, 1983: 53-7). Independent production declined steadily in importance 
for African households on white-owned farm land after about 1953. 
Countrywide, independent agricultural production contributed about 20 percent 
of the „income‟ of African households on white farms in 1950, but less than 10 
percent by 1970 (Simkins, 1984a). Many Africans continued to live and work on 
the farms. Indeed, the absolute number of Africans on white-owned farms actually 
rose slightly in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s: it was the „surplus‟ population caused 
by natural demographic growth that was removed. The African households that 
remained on white farms were still dependent on agriculture, but now they were 
fully proletarianised, entirely dependent on wages (and in-kind payments) from 
their employer, and with little opportunity to keep the cattle that had been so 
central to social and cultural life. 
 
Deagrarianisation was most evident in the reserves, where a rapidly growing 
proportion of the population lived. Forced removals from the farms combined with 
natural population growth and tightened controls on emigration to the cities, with 
the result that average population density in the reserves almost doubled between 
1955 and 1969. The proportion of the total African population living in the 
reserves rose from 40 percent through the 1950s to more than 50 percent by the 
late 1970s (Simkins, 1983). Rising populations meant growing numbers of 
effectively landless households. The total value of agricultural production 
remained steady, but the value per capita fell rapidly. By 1967 agricultural 
production accounted for only about one-quarter of the reserve population‟s food 
requirements and one-sixth of total subsistence requirements (Simkins, 1981; see 
also Lenta, 1981: 23). The proportion of households in the reserves owning cattle 
declined, just as it did on white-owned farms (Delius, 1996; Baber, 1998: 292-5; 
Beinart, 1992). Lacking oxen, and without the means to hire tractors, even families 
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with access to land could rarely plough it. Many supposedly rural areas became, in 
practice, thoroughly urban, housing the dependents of urban workers. 
 
Studies of the Transkei in 1982 showed that more than two-thirds of the income of 
poor and middle-income households came from remittances; about one-sixth, on 
average, came from old-age pensions and the remaining one-sixth from wages in 
local jobs; the contribution from agricultural production was insignificant (Wilson 
and Ramphele, 1989: 62-3). Social and economic change accentuated inequality in 
the reserves. In one area of the Transkei, the average monthly income of the top 10 
percent of households was fifteen times that of the poorest 10 percent. Income was 
so low among the poor that „it becomes difficult to afford food apart from simple 
mielie-meal, samp and porridge, clothing is a luxury, and schooling cost 
impossible – thus ensuring that the legacy of abject poverty is passed on to the 
next generation‟ (Moll, 1984: 38). Simkins estimated that income inequality rose 
in the reserves; a large majority of households actually had rising absolute incomes 
during this period, but the poor got poorer – even in absolute terms – because of 
increasing landlessness and unemployment (Simkins, 1984b: 259).  
 
By the end of apartheid, subsistence agriculture was of negligible importance in 
South Africa as a whole. Household surveys suggest that, excluding large 
commercial farmers, the value of agricultural production amounted to only 
about 1 percent of total income in 1993. Surveys might underestimate the value 
of subsistence agriculture and natural resource harvesting (see, for example, 
Shackleton et al., 2000). Even taking such underestimation into account, the 
value of agriculture for poor households was very small compared to what poor 
households received from kin through remittances, wages, or government grants.  
 
 
10. Poverty and Inequality under Apartheid  
 
The lack of data on incomes prior to the 1970s renders it difficult to plot the 
changing level of poverty with precision.  In 1971, Watts sought to extrapolate 
from the few and often dated local studies that used poverty lines based on 
Batson‟s earlier work. His best guess was that almost no white people, perhaps 
half of the coloured population, a somewhat lower proportion of the Indian 
population, and between one-third and two-thirds of the urban African 
population were living in poverty.  He did not even attempt to estimate a figure 
for the poorest section of the population, i.e. the rural African population.  
 
Estimates of life expectancy and infant mortality indicate, however, some 
general trends in welfare. Although African people in rural areas were not 
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required to register births and deaths under the 1923 Births, Marriages and 
Deaths Registration Act, and many municipalities were exempted from the 
general requirement that statistics be collected in urban areas, basic 
demographic data have been estimated (including by race) from the 1930s or 
1940s.  Life expectancy for both men and women rose sharply in the 1940s and 
1950s, after which it grew at a slower pace (see Figure 6).  By the 1980s, the life 
expectancy for African (and coloured) people had reached the level attained by 
white people about fifty years earlier.  Infant mortality also improved, with a 
similar sharp improvement after the war, followed by more gradual 
improvement thereafter.  By the 1980s, infant mortality among African children 
nationally had fallen to about 60 deaths per 1,000 births (see Figure 7).  
 
 
Figure 6: Life expectancy by race 
Source: YrBk 1934-35 p987, SA Statistics 1994 3.17 
 



















Figure 7: Infant mortality, by race 
Source: See Figure 6 
 
The fact that the infant mortality rate had not dropped further reflected, in 
significant part, the persistence of poverty, especially in rural areas.  Simkins‟ 
finding that about 15 percent of the population of the bantustans had 
experienced an absolute decline in real income between 1960 and 1980 
(Simkins, 1984b) was supported by a series of studies in the early 1980s, mostly 
conducted for a research programme on poverty funded by the Carnegie 
Commission (Wilson and Ramphele, 1989). Whilst there was an overall 
improvement in child nutrition, as many as one in three African, coloured and 
Indian children were underweight, with stunted growth.  In the poorest areas – 
including especially resettlement camps – children lived on mealie-meal 
porridge, samp and bread, almost never eating either protein or fresh greens 
(ibid: 101-6). 
 
The conduct of a countrywide poverty survey in 1993 allowed for the first 
comprehensive and countrywide analysis of poverty (Wilson, 1996).  How many 
people were poor depended on the choice of poverty line.  The post-apartheid 
government‟s analysis of the data showed that over half of the population was 
living in „poverty‟ and over one quarter in „ultra-poverty‟, using its preferred 
poverty lines (South Africa, 1995). By the international measure of US$1 per 
person per day (or R94 at the time), however, only 24 percent of the population 
was poor (Klasen, 1997: 56).  This was a higher poverty rate than in most other 
middle-income countries, but was similar to Brazil and very much lower than in 




















most other countries in Southern Africa (ibid: 63; UNDP, 1999).  Even the 
South African „ultra-poor‟ category included a small number of households with 
incomes above the $1 line.  As Klasen pointed out, however, in South Africa 
„even people having somewhat more than $1 a day are considered poor‟, 
because of the very evident wealth that existed alongside poverty (1997: 54, 
emphasis added).  
 
The 1993 survey showed not only that poverty – however defined – was 
extensive, but also that there had already been considerable upward mobility 
within the African population.  By 1993, two out of three households in the 
eighth income decile, one-third of the households in the ninth income decile and 
11 percent of households in the richest or tenth income decile were African.  
Although the Gini coefficient for income distribution in South Africa as a whole 
had not changed since the 1970s, the Gini coefficients for intra-racial income 
distribution had risen sharply.  The Gini coefficient for the African population 
had risen to above 0.6, i.e. not much less than for South Africa as a whole.  The 
„within-race‟ component of total income distribution was larger than the 
„between-race‟ component, according to decompositions using income 
inequality (Leibbrandt et al., 1999). In other words, growing numbers of African 
people were benefiting substantially from economic growth and change – even 
whilst a small minority was suffering debilitating poverty. 
 
The 1993 data showed very clearly who was poor at the end of the apartheid 
period (see Klasen, 1997; Seekings and Nattrass, 2005: chapter 6). At the 
beginning of the apartheid period, households were poor if there was no one 
within them of working age, and if they received no remittances from absent 
„members‟.  The ranks of the poor also included some households with members 
working in very low-wage occupations.  By the end of the apartheid period this 
picture had changed, especially because of the rise of unemployment.  The poor 
comprised households with no one who was working, but most of these 
households included working age adults. It was just that these adults were 
unemployed. The generous level of the old-age pension meant that households 
that included a pensioner were lifted out of deep poverty.   
 
The typical poor household in 1994 lived in a mud house, without electricity and 
running water, in a supposedly „rural‟ area; it was headed by a woman in her 40s 
or 50s, i.e. too young to receive an old-age pension, whose own parents had died 
and who was neither employed nor supported by a husband employed 
elsewhere. Such households were poor for a set of reasons.  Fundamentally, they 
were landless, and their adult members were unemployed, usually because they 
lacked the skills and connections required to get a job in a labour market that 
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offered few opportunities to the unskilled.  Living in poor areas, and lacking 
financial and social capital as well as skill and experience, they would have been 
hard-pressed to start a small enterprise.  Poor households are poor also because 
they are unable to make any significant claim on either kin (for whatever reason) 
or the state (through ineligibility for government grants or pensions).   
 
By the end of the apartheid period, government grants and pensions were 
reducing considerably the extent of poverty in South Africa.  The National Party 
had inherited, in 1948, a rudimentary welfare state that was distinctly unusual in 
the world at the time in that the state paid means-tested, non-contributory old-
age pensions and disability grants to many poor African people, and grants for 
poor mothers without non-present fathers and with dependent children to many 
poor coloured people. The apartheid state refused to raise the real, maximum 
value of the old-age pension paid to African people for almost twenty-five years 
(see the gray line in Figure 8), despite doubling the real, maximum value of the 
pension paid to white people (see the black line in Figure 8). In the later 
apartheid period, however, the state finally and slowly raised the real value of 
the old-age pension paid to African men and women, finally removing racial 
discrimination in benefits in 1993. The real value of the old-age pension in 1993 
was almost five times the real value of the pension paid to African people 
















Figure 8. The real value of the maximum old-age pension benefits by race 
 
Social assistance programmes together with public health expenditure in African 
areas were the reasons why, even at the peak of apartheid, there was (albeit 
limited) redistribution from white to African people through the budget. Whilst 
whites enjoyed a very large share of the benefits of the government‟s social 







































expenditure, they paid an even larger share of the taxes that financed these. 
McGrath (1979) calculated that the average per capita „income‟ of African 
people was increased by about 10 percent in 1960 and 1970, if account is taken 
of cash transfers and the benefits „in kind‟ of public health and education 
spending, as well as taxes paid. The per capita „income‟ of white South Africans 
was reduced by about 5 percent. This redistribution was not unimportant to key 
beneficiaries – especially pensioners – but was tiny in comparison with the 
inequality generated in the labour market (and through unequal land-ownership). 
Indeed, the state could afford some redistribution through the budget precisely 
because the budget was not the primary mechanism by which inter-racial 
distribution was shaped. One way of looking at this is to say that the apartheid 
state was so successful in steering the economy down a growth path that 
favoured a minority of South Africans and in reserving places in this minority 
for white people that it could easily afford to tax those high-earning white 
people and redistribute small sums to the disadvantaged majority.  
 
By the end of apartheid, the old-age pension programme and other social 
assistance programmes were major vehicles for redistribution from rich to poor, 
and had a substantial effect on the incidence of poverty.  Overall, at the end of 
the apartheid era, about 1.7 times more money was redistributed through the 
public welfare system than between households through remittances.  The 
consequence of this was that the very poor – i.e., approximately, people with 
incomes of less than US$1 per day, or the poorest income quintile – lived in 
households where no one was eligible for a pension or grant.  The moderately 
poor – i.e. people who were poor in terms of South Africa‟s poverty line but 
were not very poor, or approximately the second income quintile – included 
many households who had been lifted out of deep poverty by a pension or grant 
(Seekings and Nattrass, 2005: ch. 6). 
 
The role of public education in the mitigation or reproduction of inequality 
under apartheid was rather more complex than the role played by other areas of 
social policy. Public education was central to the state‟s project of ensuring that 
all white people enjoyed advantaged positions in society. Through superior 
public education, white children would be given skills that privileged them in 
the labour market, and which in time meant that they no longer had to rely on a 
job colour bar to get the better-paying jobs. Crucially, state investments in the 
education of children from poorer white families meant that the parents‟ 
disadvantages – and vulnerability to competition from low-cost coloured or 
African labour – were not passed onto the next generation. The importance of 
public education for white people was reflected in the fact that the state spent 
much more on the white minority than on the African majority – whereas the 
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public health system spent more, in aggregate, on the latter. The private health 
care sector grew much faster than the private education sector. By 1968, average 
public expenditure on African school children was just 6 percent of the value of 
average public expenditure on white school children (Auerbach and Welch, 
1981: 70; see also Fedderke et al., 2001). By 1960, the total number of white 
students passing matric was sixteen times higher than the total number of 
coloured, Indian and African students (Malherbe, 1977: 722) combined despite 
the fact that fewer than one in five eighteen-year-olds was white. The 
educational gap remained enormous until very late in the apartheid period, when 
rapidly rising numbers of African children began moving into and through 
secondary schooling.  By 1991, two-thirds of the candidates writing the matric 
examination (including in the Bantustans) were African, and fewer than one-
sixth were white.  African students made up more than half of the successful 
candidates, with white students making up about one-third (SAIRR, 1993: 606). 
 
Expenditure on the education of African children rose sixfold (in real terms) 
between the mid-1970s and early 1990s – both because of rising expenditures 
per student and rising enrollment in school (Fedderke et al., 2001; Hyslop, 
1999). There were good reasons for these reforms: Continued economic growth 
needed more semi-skilled and skilled labour than was available within the white, 
coloured and Indian populations, whilst the maintenance of political stability 
required that the state both improve opportunities for upward occupational 
mobility and rising incomes for some African people whilst at the same time 
mitigating the extremes of poverty. Just as important as the incentives to reform 
was the removal of political impediments: The state‟s past investments in public 
education for white children had ensured that almost all white South Africans 
enjoyed the privileges of class, and no longer needed overt racial discrimination 
to maintain these privileges. The expansion of educational and economic 
opportunities for some African people and the removal of the job colour bar 
would expose white South Africans to inter-racial competition, but white men 
and women competed from positions of existing educational and economic 
advantage. 
 
Fiscal incidence analysis indicates the scale of these changes. Van der Berg 
(2001: 57) calculates that the value of social expenditure per capita on African 
people relative to that on white people rose from about 12 percent in 1975 to 21 
percent by 1986 and 69 percent by 1993. By 1993, the effects of taxation and 
social expenditure were to reduce the average „income‟ of white people by about 
one-sixth whilst raising the average „income‟ of African people by one-third 
(„income‟ including here the estimated value of educational and health care 
benefits in kind). Compared to other middle-income countries (such as Brazil), 
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there is considerable redistribution through the budget in South Africa both 
because of the incidence of social expenditure and the fact that most taxes are 
paid by the rich. Standard fiscal incidence analysis does, however, value benefits 
„in kind‟ in terms of their cost, not their actual consequences. So the value of 
education to poor children is calculated in terms of what the government spends 
on the education of poor children. Insofar as teachers in poor areas are paid by 
the state but provide low quality education, then standard fiscal incidence 
analysis will overestimate the real value to the poor of public education. At the 
end of apartheid, children from poor families attended school, often into their 
late teens or even early twenties. But they left school with few skills.  
 
 
Figure 9: HDI data, 1960-92, selected countries 
Source: UNDP, 1997. 
 
The UNDP‟s Human Development Index is a composite measure of well-being 
that takes into account life expectancy, measures of educational attainment, and 
real GDP per capita (but not the distribution thereof).  Figure 9 shows UNDP 
data for South Africa and selected other middle-income countries from 1960 
until 1992 (UNDP, 1997).  South Africa – together with Mauritius – started off 
at the lead of this particular set of countries.  Its HDI rose sharply in the 1960s, 
so that South Africa actually increased its lead. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
however, its growth rate slowed dramatically, and it was overtaken by Brazil, 
Mauritius, Thailand and Turkey.  Of the six countries shown in Figure 9, only 
Algeria continued to trail South Africa, and the gap between them was 
narrowing. (In the course of the 1990s the AIDS-driven decline in life 
expectancy in South Africa resulted in a plummeting HDI, but this had not 
begun to have any effect by 1992).  


















11. The legacy of apartheid 
 
When Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress assumed office in 
1994, they inherited an economy beset with problems.  Over the previous decade 
economic growth had been erratic and weak, with GDP per capita growing by an 
average of only 0.8 percent per annum. Investment had all but dried up and 
capital was steadily draining out of the economy. Exports were limited, whilst 
there was a strong demand for imports, posing severe pressure on the exchange 
rate.  The budget deficit had widened to more than 7 percent of GDP in 1993, 
and the prospect of a debt trap loomed large. As many as three out of every ten 
adults who wanted work were unemployed. Life expectancy was longer 
(although deaths due to AIDS were about to reverse this, and life expectancy 
was to plummet). Income poverty was lower than ever before, but poverty 
remained stubbornly high, even by the austere measures (such as $1 per person 
per day) used for global comparisons. 
 
The challenges facing the new government were the product of deep-rooted 
patterns of economic activity. Most importantly, perhaps, much of South 
African business was inefficient, having grown behind protective controls on 
imported competition which helped them survive with what was, in important 
respects, a high-cost cost labour structure imposed on them by the state for 
political reasons. Industrialisation in South Africa had been based not on „cheap‟ 
labour alone, but on a distinctive combination of cheap and expensive labour.  
Skilled labour was expensive, not least because the state had for most of the 
century systematically prevented or inhibited African workers from competing 
with white voters in order to maintain and raise the standard of living of the 
latter. Some employers favoured cost-cutting, by replacing expensive white or 
skilled labour with cheaper African, unskilled or semi-skilled labour. But 
employers in general could live with expensive white or skilled labour as long as 
they were protected from foreign competition, faced rising demand from white 
consumers or the state, and could secure an abundant supply of cheap, African 
and unskilled labour when necessary. Tariffs, the circumstances of the Second 
World War and post-war import controls helped to protect domestic producers, 
and thereby helped to protect the broader system of racial discrimination and 
inequality. 
 
Ironically, when employers in the last decades of apartheid acquired more 
freedom to do away with the privileged status of skilled, white workers, they 
faced an ever more strongly organised African working class determined to 
acquire the privileges previously reserved for white workers. One of the 
mechanisms by which the standard of living of white South Africans was 
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protected was the system of wage-setting built around industrial councils (and 
the Wage Board for workers in unorganised sectors). By the late apartheid 
period both of these had ceased to be necessary for the maintenance of white 
workers‟ standard of living, because discrimination in public education had 
given white South Africans the scarce skills and credentials that allowed them to 
command higher earnings without regard for negotiated minima. The wage-
setting machinery became, instead, the mechanism through which white workers 
protected work-related benefits (such as pension funds) and employers 
prevented low-wage, labour-intensive competition. When, in the 1980s, 
independent unions emerged to represent mostly un- and semi-skilled African 
workers, they came to recognize the value of controlling industrial councils and 
the Wage Board, and using these to raise the wages and benefits paid to their 
members. Preventing the emergence of low-wage, low-cost employers was as 
important to them as it was to the large firms that dominated the employers‟ side 
of the industrial council system. By the early 1990s, the consolidation of 
centralized bargaining through the industrial councils, the provision for the 
extension of bargained agreements across whole sectors, and the strengthening 
of minimum wage-setting in unorganized sectors and industries had become 
core demands of the trade union movement.   
 
These goals gelled with the perceived need to raise productivity, to make South 
African industry more competitive. Between 1995 and 1998, the new South 
African state reformed South African labour legislation, essentially extending to 
unionized African workers the rights won by white workers in the 1920s, and 
more importantly strengthening the institutions that allowed for the realization 
of these rights. The institutions of wage-setting thus served as the mechanism 
for path dependence in the economic growth path, with continuing capital-
intensification (despite unemployment). 
 
Marxist scholars had long argued that South African capitalism was based on the 
low wages paid to, i.e. exploitation of African workers.  In the face of rising real 
wages paid to African workers in the 1960s and early 1970s (Lipton, 1974; 
Bromberger, 1974, 1978), Legassick defended the „cheap labour‟ thesis by 
arguing that apartheid policies continued „to “cheapen” labour, to make it 
cheaper than it would have been in their absence, whether or not the absolute 
magnitude of the wage of employed persons is rising or falling‟ (1978: 73-4). In 
the 1990s, formerly Marxist scholars switched to arguing that higher wages were 
appropriate because these would compel employers to manage more effectively 
and raise productivity (Joffe et al., 1991). Trade liberalisation certainly put 
inefficient producers under pressure, with substantial reductions in tariffs 
between 1994 and 2000 (Edwards, 2005; Edwards, Cassim, and van Deventer, 
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2009). (The relaxation of exchange controls also contributed to the „unbundling‟ 
of the large conglomerates; Anglo-American, most dramatically, more than 
reduced its share of the JSE to 17 percent in 1998, and then shifted its primary 
listing to the London Stock Exchange its head office to London – McGregor, 
1999). Rising wages for unskilled workers also pushed employers to invest in 
more skill- and capital-intensive technology, which had the effect of raising 
average productivity.  In manufacturing, after 1994, the rise in average wages 
and labour productivity came at the cost of falling employment (see Figure 4). 
The rising profit share was good for those employers who remained in business, 
and higher wages were good for those workers who kept their jobs. The „losers‟ 
were the predominantly unskilled workers who lost jobs, and the many more for 
whom the lack of job creation meant continuing unemployment.  
 
Rising productivity would have been unambiguously good if resources were 
fully employed, but the economy failed to grow anywhere near fast enough to 
generate the required jobs. In the decade after 1994, South Africa‟s GDP per 
capita growth of 1.2 percent per annum was comparable to Sub-Saharan Africa 
(1.1 percent per annum) and Latin America (0.8 percent per annum) but 
substantially below that of East Asia (6.2 percent per annum) and South Asia 
(3.7 percent per annum) (Rodrik, 2008: 770).  Post-apartheid economic planners 
had hoped to develop a strong export sector. However, exchange rate instability, 
skilled labour shortages, high unit labour costs and structural rigidities (notably 
specialisation in sectors with highly specific factors of production that could not 
easily be redeployed elsewhere) contributed to the decline of non-mineral 
exports rather than the hoped for expansion (Rodrik, 2008; Hausmann, 2008; 
Hausmann and Klinger, 2008; Edwards and Alves, 2006).  Overall employment 
growth lagged behind real output in all sectors – which meant that ever larger 
increases in output were necessary to facilitate new job creation. The failure to 
grow exports meant that during economic upswings South Africa experienced 
persistent and growing balance of payments deficits as import demand 
outstripped exports. While this replicated an old pattern in the South African 
growth path, what differentiated the post-apartheid period was the reliance on 
increasingly erratic flows of foreign savings (notably portfolio investment) to 
finance the current account deficit. This left the country increasingly vulnerable 
to destabilising reversals in capital flows.  
 
Growth was not entirely jobless, but rising participation rates meant that 
unemployment actually increased in the late 1990s (Bhorat and Oosthuizen, 
2006).  The consequence was that inter-racial inequality continued to decline but 
intra-racial inequality continued to grow and income poverty worsened in the 
late 1990s.  Faced with a severe fiscal crisis, inherited from the National Party 
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government but exacerbated with generous wage settlements in the public sector 
in the mid-1990s, the post-apartheid state adopted a very cautious approach to 
new social expenditure, and thereby failed to redress the immiserisation 
stemming from the labour market (Van der Berg, 2006; Seekings, 2008; 
Leibbrandt, Woolard and Woolard, 2009). 
 
In some respects, the post-apartheid economy faced the fundamental challenge 
and dilemma that had faced the Mills Commission in 1925-26. On the one hand, 
a well-organised set of citizens demanded a certain minimum standard of living 
– a „civilised‟ or „living‟ wage, for „decent‟ work, insisting on the justice of their 
claims. On the other hand, internal markets were too small and global markets 
too competitive for employers to be able to employ the entire labour force at 
these wage rates. This dilemma was resolved politically, in that the state 
intervened in the labour market to ensure that selected workers would be assured 
of higher incomes. For most of the twentieth century, employers were protected 
against imported competition in return for employing high-wage white workers. 
After apartheid, trade liberalisation exposed employers to much more intense 
competition, making it much harder to pay higher wages unless these were 
matched with increased productivity. As formal, unskilled work disappeared, 
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